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ABSTRACT
Operation Restore Hope (ORH) presents an example of how
our military is responding to the challenges of today's
changing new world order. This analysis reviews the roles,
capabilities and funding structure of the Department of
Defense (DOD) in the conduct of humanitarian assistance (HA)
.
The research considers the traditional HA roles that DOD
performs in peacetime and the new emerging role in which U.S.
led coalition and U.N. sponsored HA operations conduct peace
enforcement. As the military adapts its forces to meet this
new challenge, the budgeting structure governing DOD has not
evolved to meet these new contingent requirements.
At the onset on ORH, costs were estimated to determine DOD
funding requirements. The actual startup costs for ORH proved
to be the largest. The DOD budget mechanism in place proved
to be inflexible and not adaptable for the contingency. The
impact is severe when the Services absorb the cost for these
types of operation. The need for a long term budget mechanism
to deal with these growing contingencies exists and is the
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As non-traditional activities, peacekeeping, humanitarian
and disaster relief, and democratization programs have
been unstructured and executed on an ad hoc basis. DOD
support for these activities has been undertaken as part
of other ongoing Service missions or in response to urgent
unanticipated events. There has been no effort to
establish guidance for prioritizing and integrating these
activities into a cohesive policy framework. Statement
from 1993 Global Cooperatives Initiative Study (OASD, June
1993, p. 4)
Humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations that
involve humanitarian assistance activities compete for
Department of Defense resources. Financing these operations
often results in a redistribution of funds that would
otherwise go towards maintenance, equipment and training.
This paper researches the funding policies and procedures that
support these non-traditional activities. As the new world
order develops, humanitarian assistance will play a larger
role in American military strategy. United States military
forces are no longer facing a massive military opponent
(Towell, 1992, p. 3759). With the breakup of the former
Soviet Union, the U.S. military is the only viable organiza-
tion that can carry out independent, large-scale relief
operations worldwide. To preserve the integrity of the post
"cold war" era, the United States will have no choice but to
be a major player in relief efforts around the globe.
Beyond independent operations (including domestic disaster
relief) , the United States frequently provides a military
commitment to United Nations peacekeeping and related humani-
tarian assistance activities. The United States will
undoubtedly be an active participant in continued U.N.
operations. United Nations peacekeeping missions fall into
two categories. The first is traditional peacekeeping (post
cease-fire action) and the second is large scale collective
action. A consensus now seems to prevail that a third
category is developing, somewhere within this spectrum. In
1991, a study by the Ford Foundation described this category
as follows:
This category would be intended to put an end to random
violence and to provide a reasonable degree of peace and
order so that humanitarian relief work could go forward
and a conciliation process could commence. The forces
involved would be relatively small and would not have
military objectives as such. But unlike peacekeeping
forces, such troops would be required to take, initially
at least, certain combat risks in order to bring the
violence under control. (Urquhart, December 29, 1991)
Requirements for Department of Defense (DOD) assistance
will increase as infrastructure and nation building require-
ments of emerging democratic governments are identified (OASD,
June 1993, p. 9). Many developing countries simply cannot
control natural disaster, social unrest and human rights
issues. According to House Intelligence Committee Chairman
Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.), "The Clinton administration is going
to be more supportive of action to support humanitarian relief
and democratic movements" (Towell, 1992, p. 3761). The U.S.
led coalition, from December 1992 through May 1994, in Somalia
reinforces this statement and provides a dramatic example of
the use of military forces in non-traditional crisis interven-
tion for humanitarian purposes.
1. Humanitarian Assistance is Vital to U.S. Interests
Why should the United States become involved in
international humanitarian assistance efforts that involve the
U.S. military? There is a certain risk to lives of service
personnel as well as large financial costs that burden the
taxpayer.
Humanitarian assistance on an emotional level is the
"right thing to do" morally. President Clinton has emphasized
this theme by stating, "U.S. foreign policy cannot be divorced
from the moral principle most Americans share." On an
economic level, dollars spent on humanitarian assistance are
small compared to the costs of offsetting a future major
regional conflict. The end of the cold war has given the
United States the unparalleled opportunity to take a focused
role in eliminating instability in developing nations. The
challenge is to keep the world's developing nations in the
international fold and build a stronger global economy.
Military relief efforts go a long way toward accomplishing
this goal as they can help to promote long-term political and
economic stability. Combined with other countries, the result
is a collective engagement where nations are taking concerted
actions to pursue and solve problems that have international
implications.
Since 1988, the U.N. Security Council has approved
fourteen peacekeeping operations, more then in the previous 4
years. As the United Nations becomes the focus in deciding
global intervention, the U.S. has generally moved to support
its recommendations. Lawmakers have welcomed an active U.N.
as a way to ease the burden that the United States has
inherited in a post-cold war world. As a presidential
candidate, President Clinton said that the U.S. should explore
the possibility of establishing a "standby" voluntary U.N.
rapid deployment force to deter international aggression.
Former President Bush in his political agenda for the 1990s
listed, "meeting urgent human needs by responding quickly and
substantially to the suffering caused by natural or manmade
disasters as a challenge and focus of our efforts."
(Marshall, 1993, p. 525)
Humanitarian assistance missions also provide
invaluable training for U.S. military personnel. Although it
is a non-traditional format there can be no substitute for the
organizational skills that are used and logistical processes
that are tested because of participating in actual missions.
The real world significance of rescuing human beings from
ongoing and imminent dangers enhance morale and
confidence. Even the most realistic training mission
cannot elicit the same exhilaration that accompanies the
completion of a successful humanitarian assistance
mission. Lt. General H.C. Stackpole, Commander Operation
Sea Angel Bangladesh 1991.
Planning and executing deployments in humanitarian
relief efforts is in many respects, similar to planning and
executing the movement phase of wartime contingencies.
Therefore, these activities in humanitarian relief missions
also serve to exercise fundamental logistical capabilities.
Critics of relief missions may contend that they are to far
removed from "pure" military operations to be relevant. But,
in reality they afford experience in a cooperative "real
world" effort second only to actual combat in measuring the
effectiveness of a joint staff. (Chase, 1993, pp. 17-18)
2. Capability of U.S. Military in Humanitarian Assistance
The United States has the unique operational, material
and organizational capabilities to provide general humani-
tarian and disaster relief assistance at home and abroad. The
U.S. military is prepared to operate in areas where there is
no infrastructure or logistical support. They are also
trained for crisis action response. The United States
possesses the rapid response capability, sea-based forces and
logistical requirements to meet challenges as they arise
around the globe. Having the ability to call on a forward
deployed and sustainable force, such as a Marine Corps
Expeditionary Unit, is indispensable in humanitarian
assistance operations. Besides rapid response, the ability to
conduct operations from sea-based platforms allows for access
to remote and undeveloped regions. With the assistance of
pre-positioned shipping, operations can be sustained for
extended periods to meet the needs of the crisis. The
logistical reach of the United States' military can be
extended across time lines to meet the challenges and
commitments of national policy makers.
3. Overlapping Issues
What types of missions constitute humanitarian
assistance? The distinctions of funding categories are
divided between Peacekeeping, Disaster Relief, and
Humanitarian Assistance, though these distinctions are
somewhat artificial. For example, delivery of food and
medical supplies might be considered humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief or part of a peacekeeping effort. Typically,
the State Department will determine what the designation will
be, based on the role that it has outlined for the Department
of Defense. (MCCDC, 1993, p. 11)
Whatever the "political" designation for funding
categories, humanitarian assistance involves the allocation of
DOD resources to be used in military operations that are
conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or
manmade disaster or other endemic conditions. While
humanitarian assistance, in association with peacekeeping
operations, may require the use of limited force it is only as
a stabilizing mechanism. Humanitarian assistance helps to
neutralize a crisis for intervention by international relief
agencies. In its basic form humanitarian assistance will
involve a friendly and cooperative population within an
environment of limited infrastructure rendered unstable
because of economic and political factors. The wide spectrum
of humanitarian assistance can range from coming to the aid of
refugees on the high seas to a large scale, land operation
such as in Somalia.
At any level of operation, it will be vital that the
Department of Defense direct its focus towards budgeting for
these unplanned missions. Although there are existing
programs within the DOD structure to fund humanitarian assis-
tance efforts, they have not been able to keep pace with the
increased scope and number of activities. Funds have either
been insufficient or late in arriving. Services have been
forced to rely on their operations and maintenance budgets to
initiate and maintain national command authority directed
humanitarian assistance operations. This imposes a severe
fiscal constraint on the component commands that should be
addressed. The general impact on readiness is just beginning
to be felt as the Services must also operate within a
declining defense budget.
B. SPECIFIC PROBLEM
How can DOD effectively plan budgeting requirements for
future Humanitarian Assistance Operations?
An overriding factor for planning DOD involvement in
humanitarian operations is monetary considerations. A break
in the funding process to support normal operations can
7
greatly effect readiness demands. Funding constraints also
inhibit the flexibility of the on-scene commander to
accomplish his mission.
Without a system for streamlining funding procedures, DOD
is forced to resort to ad hoc methods to support operations.
For example, the Department of Defense was required to use
$100 million from the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF)
to finance Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq. This
procedure diverts resources from their intended purpose and
creates long-term funding problems. Excess cash in a
revolving account like the DBOF can either be used to lower
the rates charged to its customers or diverted for other uses
while customer rates remain at artificially high levels. This
hides the identity of the bill payer for humanitarian
operations, the operations and maintenance costumers. This
situation requires improvement in the planning and budgeting
process.
Historical data shows that in many humanitarian assistance
operations, Services were never totally reimbursed for their
incremental costs. Incremental costs are defined as those
costs that would not have been incurred had the operation not
been directed. For example, the regular pay of active duty
personnel would not be an incremental cost because these
personnel would have been paid whether or not the operations
took place. The pay of activated reservists, however, would
be an incremental cost. Today's budget mechanisms to support
8
humanitarian assistance operations have not been adequately
integrated into the Department of Defense's funding process,
nor have they kept pace with DOD's responsibilities.
Integration in this instance refers to the timing, funding and
statutory limitations inherent in the current process that
inhibit the flexibility of the operational commander providing
support. The unpredictable nature of humanitarian assistance
operations make it necessary to find the true costs of such
operations.
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following questions were addressed and answered in
support of the primary research subject.
1. How are humanitarian assistance operations being
coordinated between DOD and the State Department?
2
.
What is the flow of funding within DOD for humanitarian
assistance operations?
3. What are the costs involved in humanitarian assistance
operations?
4. What are likely scenarios for future humanitarian
assistance operations?
5. At what levels can humanitarian assistance operations be
planned for in advance?
Each question relates to a particular aspect of humani-
tarian assistance planning. The research conducted to answer
each question provided a focus for planning effective funding
for these operations.
D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
Much analysis of the humanitarian assistance funding issue
has been limited to individual operations. This research
project identifies the historical development of humanitarian
operations and their particular funding sources. A cost
analysis presented on Operation Provide Hope in Somalia is
used to determine the typical costs incurred in humanitarian
operations. Based on the data presented from government
sources a profile of future operations will be outlined.
The research for this project was conducted in the form of
data collection and interviews with The Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Programs, Analysis and Evaluation (OSD,
PA&E) , The Office of Global Affairs, U.S. Transportation
Command and various DOD Comptrollers. This thesis topic
originated from OSD (PA&E) and they were a major facilitator
for the project. Cost data was collected from many government
agencies, to include the Marine Expeditionary Force
Comptroller for Somalia. Additional cost data was obtained
from various references located at the Naval Postgraduate
School.
E. CHAPTER CONTENTS
Chapter II is a historical narrative outlining the U.S.
military's role in humanitarian assistance. The development
of various programs to meet the changing needs of operational
funding are discussed. Chapter III presents the current and
proposed funding process of the Department of Defense in
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support of humanitarian assistance. The roles and missions of
various agencies that control the funding process are
discussed.
Chapter IV is an analysis of the costs incurred during
Operation Provide Hope in Somalia. The data used is based on
costs for military forces until the transfer of operations to
U.N. authority in May 1993. Chapter V is a profile of future
humanitarian assistance operations. Different criteria are
used to determine where and when humanitarian operations might




Freed from cold war restraints and obligations, the
American military may turn out to be the ideal organiza-
tion for global humanitarian emergencies (Lynch, February
1993, p. 60)
.
The ongoing United Nations' sanctioned humanitarian relief
effort in Somalia provides us with a look of what may be the
model for future military humanitarian action. Somalia was
the largest, latest, and most expensive example of United
States military involvement in humanitarian aid. The
military's role in humanitarian assistance has taken an
upsurge during the last two years. This increase in the
number of non-combat missions for the military has also meant
a dramatic increase in the scope of the actual operations.
Somalia is yet another example of how our country is
responding militarily to the new and turbulent world order
through actions defined under "humanitarianism.
"
Joint Publication 3-05 defines humanitarian assistance as
Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of
natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions
such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that
might present a serious threat to life or that can result
in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian
assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and
duration. The assistance provided is designed to
supplement or compliment the efforts of the host nation,
civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary
responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.
The environment that the military can expect to operate in
while providing humanitarian assistance will vary from a
benign situation to large scale conflict. Under ideal
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conditions, humanitarian assistance will involve friendly and
cooperative recipients who have just experienced a tragic
disaster that is beyond the capabilities of their own
government to mitigate. This type of aid may only require the
logistical support of the military. At the other end, as
characterized today, humanitarian assistance may be conducted
in conjunction or simultaneously with peacekeeping or peace-
enforcement operations. This type of aid would involve both
combat and logistical military support.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief have proven to
be important tools in promoting our foreign policy and
national security interests. To that end, the Department of
Defense has been addressing both ongoing and emergency needs
of countries through several congressionally authorized
humanitarian assistance programs. These funded initiatives
provide another example of the military's role in humanitarian
aid. There are currently three major legislated humanitarian
programs: Humanitarian Assistance Program, Title 10
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, and the Foreign
Disaster Assistance Program. There are also programs funded
to provide domestic disaster assistance within the United
States. In Title 42, of the United States Code, the
utilization of DOD resources and services is authorized within
prescribed limits.
To analyze the issues involved with military support for
humanitarian aid, an understanding of humanitarian assistance,
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disaster relief and the programs that provide support is
required. This chapter will provide a historical perspective
for these topics as they relate to Department of Defense.
Examples will be presented of current DOD military operations
as they relate to humanitarian assistance. These examples
will illustrate at what levels humanitarian assistance
operations can be planned. The chapter will also outline the
planning and coordination required between DOD and the
Department of State (DOS) for providing humanitarian
assistance.
B. THE HISTORICAL NATURE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Not only does man support man, but all nature does so.
The stars and the planets, and even the Angels support
each other. Tikkune Zohar, 122, T. 43. (Newman, 1945, p.
60)
As the biblical quotation above recognizes the virtues of
providing charity and a helping hand, our own humanitarian
concerns today rest on these same moral precepts of our Judeo-
Christian teachings. Humanitarian aid is also thought of from
a foreign policy perspective as preventive medicine directed
at third-world problems. If their problems are not remedied
or improved, it could possibly lead to political unrest,
violence, and ultimately armed conflict.
Consider for example, the role of famine in Somalia
during the 1960s. In effect, our aid programs addressed
only the social unrest and were guided by our "security-
related" foreign policy. This foreign policy centered on the
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containment of the Soviet Union and its proxies. Thirty-four
years later, we find ourselves again in Somalia confronting
the same situation that we faced earlier. Today we are on the
threshold of charting a new global course to deal with these
types of humanitarian situations. As we should appreciate
today, the use of humanitarian assistance must be a well-
thought, integrated strategy that is coordinated and based on
a genuine concern for the long-term well being and development
of the recipients. The costs of not pursuing the right
strategy may influence the outcome of the "new world order"
that we are trying to create.
Without a declared disaster, DOD can address a variety of
constant humanitarian needs facing undeveloped countries
primarily by making available and transporting to them excess
non-lethal DOD property. Department of Defense excess
property includes medical supplies, clothing and gear,
shelter, food, and heavy equipment and vehicles. This program
is called the Excess Property Program. It is also the largest
program in the Humanitarian Assistance Program. This program
was established by the Defense Authorization Act of 1986 and
codified in Title 10 of the USC section 2547 (GAO, January
1991, p. 1) . The program is presently coordinated for DOD by
the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Affairs (Humanitarian Assistance) . DOD provides these
items on a worldwide basis when tasked through and coordinated
by the Department of State.
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This program began in 1985 when Congress appropriated
funds to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan
resistance groups. As Congress approved wider authority, to
include additional countries and activities, more than 100
countries have benefitted from DOD humanitarian assistance
(Touma, 1993, p. 2). The new authority included medical
evacuation of war wounded and injured individuals to the
United States and Europe for privately arranged medical care.
The primary role that the military performs in this program,
beyond providing excess property, is the transportation of
these items around the world. Historically, the costs of
transporting these items have required the greatest percentage
of humanitarian assistance funds (GAO, 1991, p. 10)
.
The Humanitarian Assistance Office in DOD also coordinates
the execution of the Denton Space Available Transportation
Program. This program authorized by Title 10, Section 4 02,
allows the Secretary of Defense to transport, without charge,
on a space available basis, humanitarian relief supplies
furnished by non-governmental sources. This authority is the
only legal means to transport private cargo on U.S. military
aircraft. This program is an interagency effort involving the
DOS, Agency for International Development (AID) , and the
United States Air Force (USAF) . A listing of the program's
status of support for Fiscal Year 1991 is provided in Appendix
A.
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To date the most extensive effort of humanitarian
assistance under this program has been to the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) . This effort, known as Operation
Provide Hope, began on January 27, 1992. This ongoing effort
provides DOD airlift and sealift assets to transport both U.S.
government and privately donated supplies and materials to the
CIS. According to a State Department report, "The airlift
also marks the beginning of what we hope will become over
time, a truly international effort aimed at accelerating
shipment of emergency supplies to the former Soviet Union."
This initial airlift operation began phase one of
Operation Provide Hope and transported an estimated 4 .
5
million pounds of food and medicine on 64 relief flights
(Smith, 1992, p. 1). Phase II of the operation began on
February 27, 1992 and used both air and sea modes to deliver
relief. Normal humanitarian assistance procedures require DOD
to transfer the excess property over to a State Department
representative. The country representative receiving the
property is responsible for its distribution. (GAO, 1991, p.
2) During this operation, the unique capabilities of the
military to support humanitarian assistance forged a new
mission for peace. The Army's On-site Inspection Agency
(OSIA) has the mission of supporting the verification of
nuclear weapons reduction treaties between the United States
and the former Soviet Union. As such, its members are fluent
in the Russian language and knowledgeable about the host
17
country. Due to the size of the distribution requirements of
the relief, the OSIA was deployed back to the CIS to assist
the DOS representative in coordinating this mission. In all,
the OSIA, traveled over 400,000 miles to coordinate the
distribution of aid to the former Soviet republics. The new
non-traditional role being conducted by the military in
humanitarian assistance is summarized by the following
quotation of one OSIA member "the mission was the most
gratifying thing I've done in my life. During my time in the
Army, I expected to go to the Soviet Union only one way—in a
tank. Never like this." (Hasenauer, 1992, p. 46)
Operation Provide Hope was an emergency humanitarian
relief effort supported by the military that is now entering
its third phase in 1993. The goal of providing aid to
alleviate the suffering of the people, and to promote the
ongoing democratic developments in the CIS, is a challenge to
our leaders. The degree of strategic planning and interna-
tional cooperation in this effort will dictate how effective
these measures are in the future.
C. TITLE 10 HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Humanitarian assistance can also be performed by the
military during the conduct of military operations. In this
regard, congress has authorized the military under specified
circumstances to conduct humanitarian and civic assistance
(H/CA) during its training overseas. This program, commonly
called "Title 10," is administered by the regional commanders
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(CINCs) directly, with coordination and approval provided by
the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Affairs. This program, as do all the above humani-
tarian assistance programs, involves interagency coordination.
No humanitarian assistance may be provided under this program
unless it is specifically authorized by the State Department.
The CINC is responsible for budgeting, defending, and
programming for these initiatives. The CINC develops a
five-year plan for projects in his area of responsibility.
The planning process begins with the CINC coordinating with
the State Department's host nation team to determine viable
military projects for the host government (Pence, 1989, p.
27). After coordination at the local level, the project is
submitted as part of the five-year plan to the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs
(Humanitarian Assistance Office) . This office then conducts
the coordination with DOS for submission to the Secretary of
Defense for final approval (Pence, 1989, p. 36). The
provisions for this program are found in Title 10 USC, Chapter
20, Section 401. The restrictions on the use of Title 10
funds for humanitarian activities are as follows:
1. They promote the security interest of both the United
States and the host government.
2. That the specific operational skills of the military
personnel involved are exercised.
3. That the activity complements rather than duplicates the
efforts of other forms of assistance.
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4. This assistance may not be provided to individuals,
groups, or organizations engaged in military activities.
The congressional authority restricts H/CA, funded under Title
10, to the following:




Construction of rudimentary surface transportation
systems
.
3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation
facilities.
4. Rudimentary construction and repair of public
facilities.
The Stevens Amendment authority contained in USC Title 10,
Section 4 02, provides the same authority and guidelines for
conducting humanitarian and civic assistance together with
Joint Chief Staff (JCS) directed exercises (Pence, 1989 p.
11) . These programs, which involve military forces on
training exercises or deployments in foreign countries, have
a worldwide impact.
This type of humanitarian assistance can be viewed as the
military's preventive medicine to alleviate suffering and help
the development of poor nations. As the value of this program
becomes better understood by all, several opportunities to
improve our capability to provide humanitarian assistance
becomes evident. The role of the Civil Affairs specialist in
support of humanitarian efforts stands out. This is a
military specialty that is required in time of war to be able
to perform the following:
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1. Provide emergency care and evacuation.
2. Establish or supervise the operation of temporary or
semi-permanent camps.
3. Resettle or return civilians dislocated by war to their
homes
.
4. Advise and assist host-country and U.S. agencies on
camps and relief measures for dislocated civilians.
(Barnes, 1989, p. 12)
The biggest obstacle in employing Civil Affairs (CA) units
in humanitarian assistance are their reserve status. In fact,
97% of CA units are in a reserve status. (Barnes, 1989, p.
39) From a funding perspective, however only the costs for
transportation, subsistence and housing are required to
support reservists used for H/CA efforts while undergoing
annual training. The value of providing training for CA units
in support of peacetime disaster relief efforts can only
improve the capability of our CINCs in responding to the new
mission of humanitarianism.
The invaluable use of logistical specialties such as
engineering, medical, and dental in Title 10 projects has been
amply documented. Exercising logistical support as part of a
training mission while simultaneously providing humanitarian
assistance to those in need is a prudent use of limited
operations and maintenance funds. The need to expand the
funding and integrate projects in a coordinated long range
plan for developing countries is vital. This would involve
governmental and private agencies in humanitarian assistance
and should be the vision for the future.
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D. INFLUENCE OF THE 1961 FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM
Under the Foreign Disaster Assistance Program, DOD can
provide disaster relief assistance on a worldwide basis. The
agency for International Development (AID) Office of U.S.
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) coordinates all forms of
relief efforts, both governmental and private, in responding
to foreign disasters. This program began when Congress passed
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This act was codified
into Title 22 of the United States Code. Under this legisla-
tion, the President can draw down on military resources to
provide humanitarian assistance to foreign countries or
international organizations for emergency requirements (U.S.
Code Title 22, 1989, p. 506). This legislation established
the responsibilities, authorities and limitations to conduct
foreign disaster assistance. The legislation, however, does
not address domestic disaster relief. The following
discussion on the subject of disaster and the unique capabil-
ities that the military can provide is germane to all types of
disaster. The Department of Defense defines disaster relief
as "prompt aid which can be used to alleviate the suffering of
foreign disaster victims." (DOD Directive 5100.46, 1976, p.
1) This assistance can take the form of coordinating large
scale operations, providing assessment, planning, and other
logistical support, providing material support such as food
and other supplies, and evacuating refugees. The first record
of a DOD assistance to an OFDA request for Foreign Disaster
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Relief assistance occurred in FY 1984. This relief support was
provided to Zaire and it involved an airlift of medical
equipment to combat an AIDS epidemic. Appendix B contains a
listing of DOD responses for foreign disaster assistance from
1984 to 1991. This listing provides DOD disaster relief
support up to Operation Provide Comfort in April 1991. In most
cases, the primary support provided by the military was for
transportation of emergency supplies and equipment.
Disaster is understood by many to be caused by natural
phenomena such as floods hurricanes or a major accident. It
could also be the results of man-made activities such as
warfare. In such circumstances, local, national, and non-
governmental relief agencies may be inadequate to respond to
the humanitarian crisis and emergency international relief may
be requested. United States involvement begins after our
ambassador in the effected country declares an emergency. It
is under these circumstances known as "disaster relief" that
military forces may be called upon to provide emergency
humanitarian assistance.
Disasters can be either natural or man-made. Disasters
can be further broken down as shown in Table 2-1.
Relief support for disasters can be broken down into three
interdependent phases: emergency, rehabilitation, and post-
rehabilitation. The emergency phase deals with the immediate
aid to survivors of a disaster. The military possesses the













Source: Skeet, "Manual For Disaster Relief Work," 1977.
under adverse operating conditions. This is a factor that
often prevents traditional relief organizations from providing
the needed aid in a timely manner. This role for the military
in the emergency phase falls within the provisions of the
foreign disaster relief program.
The next two phases of disaster relief that precede the
emergency phase deal with the rehabilitation for the country.
This assistance can be characterized by providing assistance
that allows the country to return to a state of 'normalcy' and
efforts to provide long-term development (GAO, October 1992,
p. 9) . This form of aid is carried out by the present system
for international relief. The organizations that support this
system are the United Nations, private organizations, and
donor governments (Green, 1977, p. 29). The role of Title 10
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programs involving military humanitarian assistance during
training operations can also be a consideration during these
phases. Even though the CINC Title 10 programs are planned
five years in advance for funding purposes, the CINC is
authorized to request modification (substitutions) to this
plan to meet emergent high priority Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance activities (Pence, 1989, p. 41). The unique
contributions and benefits to be gained by employing Civil
Affairs units in these efforts were addressed previously in
this chapter.
To appreciate the unique role that the military can
perform in disaster relief, an understanding of the critical
aspects of disaster relief that determine success or failure
is required. These elements of relief are preparedness,
prediction, assessment, appropriate intervention, timely
intervention, and coordination (Kent, 1987, p. 21). In every
one of these elements the military can provide a unique
contribution.
Preparedness deals essentially with pre-disaster planning.
Here the capabilities of CA units can be used to train the
host government and its agencies in the procedures required to
assist civilians in need. Here is a vital wartime mission for
the military that can be easily applied during training or to
the increasing number of peacetime "humanitarianism" missions
that the military is tasked to support. Unfortunately, during
peacetime the Federal Emergency Management (FEMA) has been
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reluctant to use CA units in CONUS and the Department of State
reluctant to request military assistance overseas (Barnes,
1989, p. 39). The use of engineering tasks in Title 10
projects to support disaster prevention is a possibility.
Examples would be reinforcing existing structures to withstand
earthquakes or digging irrigation ditches for drought control
in areas were disaster can be predicted. In recognition of
the military's role and requirements in this area, funding was
earmarked in FY 1993 for DOD disaster relief planning and
preparedness activities (Touma, 1993, p. 3). Prediction is
the second element of disaster relief. Disasters often are
not unforeseen events. Technology now exists to identify the
hazards that may threaten a country and estimate the areas and
settlements that will be effected (Kent, 1987, p. 22. As our
country downsizes its military infrastructure and converts
military technology to civilian use, we may find alternative
uses of existing systems. Only recently the Navy's secret
underwater program developed to detect the former Soviet
Union's submarines is being integrated with civilian disaster
monitoring agencies to predict earthquakes. The degree of
benefits to be derived in this area will be a function of how
well we integrate the capabilities of all in providing
humanitarian aid in this maze of interagency involvement.
Assessment is the third element of disaster relief. The
importance of determining the requirements of a disaster is
critical in the emergency phase. This is normally performed
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by the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) provided by
OFDA after a disaster (GAO, October 1992, p. 11). As we saw
during Operation Provide Hope, when the assessment involves a
major relief effort the military can play a vital role in
supporting DART.
Appropriate intervention is the fourth element of disaster
relief. This element deals with ensuring that the correct
type of relief is provided. This could take the form of
providing the right types of equipment and supplies to deal
with the disaster. The military's allowance of equipment
contain many items in the area of engineering, transportation,
and communication that could classify as critical to the
conduct of a relief effort. The military has the capability
to establish expeditionary airfields where none exist to
support the delivery of needed emergency supplies. They also
have the capability to deliver supplies externally by either
fixed-wing (airdrops) or rotary-wing (external lift) aircraft
to reach remote areas inaccessible by land transportation.
The capability to either produce or deliver, and store fuel
and water in large quantities is a critical life sustaining
capability which the military possesses. Finally, the ability
to communicate which is so essential to the control of any
operation is an area that the military maintains sufficient
assets to meet its wartime missions. Many times during
disasters when a nation's communication system is disrupted,
problems arise that directly impact on relief assistance.
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Supplies pertaining to shelter, food, and medicine are part of
the military's supply system and in most cases are on hand and
appropriate to disaster relief requirements. The above topics
are addressed in the latter part of this section when specific
military humanitarian operations are analyzed.
The fifth element is timely intervention. This element
compliments the element of appropriate intervention. No
matter how accurate an assessment of needs for relief are
determined, unless the relief is provided in a timely manner
it is of no value. It is here where the utility of the
military's logistic pipeline to deliver personnel, equipment
and supplies are unmatched by any nation or private organiza-
tion. The following description of the magnitude of the
military's disaster relief effort during 30 days in 1992 best
demonstrates this principle.
The amount of cargo the Air Force carried into Florida in
the first ten days (14,000 tons) was nearly identical to
the volume of shipments brought to Saudi Arabia at the
start of Operation Desert Shield in August 1990. Air
Mobility Command (AMC) officers calculated that, between
August 5 and September 24, an Air Force airlifter touched
down every three minutes bringing supplies to Florida or
Hawaii, helping typhoon victims on Guam, or ferrying food
and medicine to points in Yugoslavia and the old Soviet
empire. (Lynch, 1993, p. 63)
The final element of disaster relief is coordination.
This is the element where we believe our military greatest
strength lies. The inherent capabilities of military command
and control procedures and organization used to deal with
military operations can ideally be employed to support a
humanitarian operation. The challenge here is to effectively
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integrate the efforts of all the participants both
governmental and private toward a common mission
humanitarian aid.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study on
the Foreign Disaster Assistance Program in 1992. Its scope did
not include the role of DOD, but it did address a number of
issues pertinent to this thesis. A summary of these issues
and conclusions are provided:
1. Development and Disaster Assistance are not fully inte-
grated.
2. Because disasters are unpredictable, Congress authorized
special provisions to permit OFDA to use expedited
procurement procedures to fund its requirements.
3. Civil war undermines effective relief efforts.
4. U.N. coordination is not always effective (GAO, October
1992, pp. 29-54)
.
One problem identified the lack of linkage between
disaster relief and development activities sponsored by the
State Department which result in a reduced likelihood of
integration of these activities (GAO, October 1992, p. 3). As
we defined the phases of disaster relief earlier, implicit to
this process is that the efforts in each phase influences the
actions of those that follow. To ensure that the funds
provided for humanitarian assistance are spent efficiently,
the efforts involved in all phases of disaster relief must be
integrated in a long range plan. The GAO report also noted
the need to possess funding flexibility and special
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appropriations to ensure responsive support to unplanned
disasters (GAO, October 1992, p. 33).
The report also did not evaluate the role and effective-
ness of U.N. relief operations. The report did note that OFDA
officials felt that the U.N. had not been consistently
effective in coordinating disaster relief (GAO, October 1992,
p. 30) . Recognition was acknowledged, however, for the
current U.N. initiative to strengthen its role in coordinating
international relief. In February 1992, the Secretary-General
appointed a new Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs to coordinate U.N. emergency assistance efforts around
the world. The responsibilities of the new Secretary-General
include:
1. Coordinating and facilitating the U.N.'s assistance in
those emergencies requiring coordinated response;
2. Facilitating access to emergency areas for rapid
delivery of emergency assistance;
3
.
Serving as a central focal point with governments and
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations
concerning U.N. emergency relief operations and, when
appropriate and necessary, mobilizing their emergency
relief capacities; and
4. Promoting the smooth transition from relief to rehabil-
itation and reconstruction as relief operations under
his aegis are phased out (GAO, 1992, p. 30).
In 1977, the Council on Foreign Relations, a non-profit
and non-partisan organization devoted to international
affairs, sponsored a number of studies to look at issues that
would be of an international concern in the coming two
decades. The studies were known as the 1980s project and one
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of them, conducted by Stephen Green in 1977 dealt with
international disaster relief. His study provides a framework
for establishing a more responsive international relief system
built around the U.N. that is still relevant today (Green,
1977, p. 22). The end of the Cold War has created an
environment that is conducive to Green's vision of sixteen
years ago. He foresaw the increase in number and intensity of
future disasters. He also understood the importance of
coordinating and integrating the limited resources we have for
providing relief (Green, 1977, p. 48). In all the above
humanitarian programs that DOD participates, the level of
interagency coordination required is extensive. If one
considers that different agencies approve and coordinate the
funding for these programs, the problem is magnified and can
impose problems for the commander charged with the mission for
providing support.
E. APPLICATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Sea Angel are
current examples of the application of the humanitarian
assistance process in action. Both of these operations have
become benchmarks in the development of humanitarian
assistance in military mission planning.
1. Operation Provide Comfort
On 5 April 1991, the United Nations Security Council
passed U.N. Resolution 688 condemning Iraq for its repression
of the Kurds and appealing to member states to provide relief
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to the Kurdish refugees (Cavenaugh, 1992, p. 7) . That same
day President Bush assigned DOD the mission of providing
humanitarian relief to the Kurdish civilians fleeing the
repression of Saddam Hussein into mountains of Northern Iraq
and Southern Turkey. This new resolution would set a
precedent in international law for future humanitarian
operations. Now the U.N. claimed the authority to intervene
unilaterally in a sovereign state's territory for humanitarian
purposes. In this situation, the host country of Iraq
resisted foreign interference in its territory. So began
Operation Provide Comfort which would be the largest relief
effort undertaken by the military up until that time.
This humanitarian intervention effort would become a
combined task force involving thirteen allied nations. At the
height of Operation Provide Comfort, over 21,000 allied troops
would be deployed throughout Turkey, Northern Iraq, and aboard
ships in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. In all, over 30
countries and 50 private and non-governmental organization
would provide personnel and supplies (Allardice, 1991, Jull
71024-35616)
.
The initial mission of the combined task force (CTF)
was to feed the Kurds and reduce the suffering and dying by
providing short-term air delivery of supplies. Air delivery
of food, blankets, tents, and medical supplies to the Kurds
along a 206-mile border area began on April 7, 1991 (Goff,
1992, p. 1). This mission was expanded to sustainment of the
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entire refugee population for thirty days and to deploy
humanitarian forces directly into the refugee areas. This
mission required the CTF to:
1. Provide sufficient food and water;
2. Provide medical care;
3. Move into the refugee camps;
4. Provide assistance for aerial resupply effort;
5. Build a distribution center;
6. Organize the refugee camps;
7. Supervise the distribution of food and water;
8. Improve sanitation; and
9. Provide medical care (Allardice, 1991, JULL 121049-
17995)
.
On April 16, 1992 the decision was made to establish
a security zone in Northern Iraq in order to eventually move
the stabilized refugees to more supportable locations where
temporary camps with better facilities were established
(Allardice, 1991, JULL 21049-45804) . Forward ground bases or
transit centers were established in both Turkey and Northern
Iraq to expedite the distribution of supplies. As the
military situation in Northern Iraq was stabilized, temporary
communities were built to house the displaced refugees, the
first of these communities was built near Zakhu, Iraq. By the
middle of May 92, CTF personnel began assisting the refugees
to return to their homes. On June 7, 1991 the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees assumed responsibility for the
humanitarian relief effort and the last transit camp was
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closed (Allardice, 1991, JULL 21049-45804). Thus Operation
Provide Comfort ended its first phase of humanitarian relief
efforts for a man-made disaster. However, the operation would
continue into its second phase from 17 July to 24 October
1992. The mission of Operation Provide Comfort II was to
provide security in the area of Northern Iraq and Southeastern
Turkey while the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) assumed
responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance for the
Kurds (Collins, 1992, p. 22). Support is still being provided
at this time to Northern Iraq by the United States European
Command (EUCOM) which was tasked with the control of the
original operation (Interview with Melanson, July 14, 1993).
The significant accomplishment of Operation Provide
Comfort was the military's successful completion of the
emergency phase of an enormous disaster relief effort and the
efficient transition of relief activities to civilian
agencies. In fact, CARE, the leading NGO in country, was able
to take over all food-distribution operations in less than a
month upon arrival into the secured zone of Northern Iraq
(Elmo, 1992, p. 9)
.
2 . Operation Sea Angel
Even though our military forces were actively
undertaking the largest relief effort of its time during the
month of April 1991 in Iraq, a devastating tragedy was
unfolding in Bangladesh.
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On the night of April 29, 1991, Bangladesh, was hit by
a cyclone named Marian. That evening, 139,000 people would be
killed, more than one million cattle would perish, and the
country's entire infrastructure along the Bay of Bengal would
be destroyed. The magnitude of this disaster was catastrophic
and beyond the capabilities of the country and NGO to provide
assistance. On May 10th, the U.S. Ambassador formally
requested military assistance. The following day CJCS issued
the execute order to USCINCPAC to provide assistance to
Bangladesh (Stackpole, 1992, p. 1).
Within 24 hours, General Stackpole and a small team had
reached the scene—the leading element of a joint task
force that would touch the lives of 1.7 million survivors
during a five-week operation. To the people of
Bangladesh, they were angels of mercy, coming from the
sea. The operation's code name was a perfect fit: Sea
Angel. (Stackpole, 1992, p. 110)
In 1970, Bangladesh then East Pakistan, experienced a
similar disaster, a cyclone followed by a tidal wave would
devastate these countries. It was estimated that 500,000
people died, most of the livestock was drowned, almost all its
crops were destroyed, and the countries suffered enormous
infrastructure damage (Skeet, 1977, p. 2). This disaster also
occurred during a time of political instability in Bangladesh,
which created a massive refugee movement involving ten million
people fleeing to India. Disaster relief efforts were halted
in 1971 because of developing civil unrest when Bangladesh
declared its independence. War finally erupted with India and
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relief efforts could not be reinitiated until 1972 (Skeet,
1977, p. 3)
.
The situation for Bangladesh in 1991 bore some
similarity to the events that transpired 20 years earlier. A
large disaster had occurred to the country during a time of
political instability. However, the commander for Operation
Sea Angel developed a three phased campaign plan that dealt
with both the disaster and the current political situation.
The three phases of the relief plan were as follows:
1. Phase I : Deployment of initial command and control and
assessment of the situation.
2. Phase II : Immediate assistance and deployment of addi-
tional forces.
3. Phase II : Follow-on assistance to permit the government
of Bangladesh to carry on the recovery effort
(Stackpole, 1992, p. 1).
The initial emergency relief effort involved the Joint
Task Force (JTF) headquarters and Army Special Forces Disaster
Relief Survey Teams who performed the function of disaster
assessment. These forces were augmented on May 15, 1992 by an
Amphibious Task Force (ATF) of 7 ships returning from Opera-
tion Desert Shield.
Medical support and the production and distribution of
water were critical elements of this relief effort. The
transportation of supplies by helicopters and Landing Craft
Air Cushion (LCAC) were successful in overcoming the washed
out and non-existent road networks to reach the survivors in
need. The use of amphibious forces also enabled the JTF to
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keep a minimum footprint ashore during the operation.
Operation Sea Angel, as was the case in Operation Provide
Comfort, was a large scale joint/coalition operation with
significant NGO integration. In both cases, international
efforts to provide emergency relief were deficient in
capabilities and required the assistance of the military. The
prior planning for disaster preparedness that the United
States Pacific Command (USPACOM) conducted for its area of
responsibility helped in the planning and conduct of Operation
Sea Angel (Marshall, 1993, p. 17).
The operation spanned over 4 weeks, delivered over
4,000 tons of supply by air, 2,000 tons by LCAC, and over
266,000 gallons of water was produced by Reverse Osmosis Water
Purification Units (ROWPU) . Also 7,000 Bangladesh citizens
were provided medical treatment (Gangle, 1991, MCLL 61048-
62515) .
F. DOMESTIC DISASTER RELIEF
Under the Major Disaster Assistance Program, DOD can
provide disaster relief assistance in the United States.
Title 42 USC, Sections 5121-5203, also known as the Stafford
Act, provides the authorization and authority to conduct
disaster relief. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) is the lead federal agency for disaster relief. FEMA's
Federal Response Plan assigns DOD with the primary responsi-
bility for two of the twelve Emergency Support Functions
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(ESF) . The ESF assigned to DOD are Public Works and
Engineering, and Urban Search and Rescue.
For the vast majority of disasters that occur each year,
FEMA provides responsive disaster relief support through its
Federal Response Plan (FRP) . During the disasters that have
occurred in the last two years, DOD has provided assistance
well beyond those two primary designated ESF functions. The
recent domestic disasters have shown that when a disaster is
of a catastrophic nature the entire relief system can become
quickly overwhelmed. As is the case for Title 10 programs,
involuntary call-up of reserve units or personnel for disaster
relief operations is prohibited. The issue of using Civil
Affairs units to support humanitarian assistance is germane.
G. DOMESTIC DISASTER RELIEF APPLICATION
At 0500 on August 24, 1992 Hurricane Andrew struck the
state of Florida. The destruction from this hurricane cost an
estimated $20 billion dollars (Davis, 1992, p. 2633). On the
same day, DOD was tasked by FEMA to provide disaster relief
assistance. On August 27th, Joint Task Force Andrew (JTFA)
was formed to provide humanitarian support and relief
operations.
The JTFA was to provide support by establishing field
feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo
transfer operations, local and line haul transportation, and
other logistical support to the local population (Department
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of Army, 1933, p. 2) . JTFA operations were conducted in three
phases:
1. Phase I ; Relief Phase - provide immediate life
support systems for food, water, shelter,
medical supplies, services, sanitation, and
transportation
.
2. Phase II ; Recovery Phase - ensure sustainment of
those services provided in Phase I while
assisting Federal, State, and local
governments within our capabilities to
establish public services.
3. Phase III : Reconstitution - Continue reestablishment
of services under control of non-DoD
Federal, State, and local governments while
JTFA redeployed (JTFA AA Report, 199 3, p.
4).
In the largest peacetime deployment of DOD forces in the
United States' history, Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew achieved
a hugh success in accomplishing its disaster relief mission in
Southern Florida in the wake of Hurricane Andrew.
Within a three week period of Hurricane Andrew two
additional regions of the United States suffered major natural
disasters. These disasters were Typhoon Omar on Guam that
occurred on August 28, 1992 and Hurricane Iniki which that
struck the Island of Kauai on September 11, 1992. In both
these disasters, DOD provided emergency relief support.
Appendix C, summarizes DOD's domestic disaster relief support
for these disasters.
The above examples of disaster relief operations provided
by the military, demonstrate an outstanding opportunity to
help Americans in need. These events provided an opportunity
to provide humanitarian assistance and realistic logistic
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support training. In the above cases, the military provided
the critical initial emergency assistance and then turned over
the relief efforts to appropriate civilian relief agencies.
There is one example of a military humanitarian assistance
operation that demonstrates, however, the wrong way to employ
military forces. This ongoing tasking, which involves refugee
assistance, is Operation Gitmo. This operation began in the
fall of 1991 with the Coast Guard rescuing Haitian refugees at
sea. As the number of Haitians fleeing their homeland
increased, the involvement of DOD expanded to include the
Navy, Army, and Marine Corps. A joint task force was
established for this humanitarian mission. The military
established a refugee camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to
temporarily house the Haitians. As diplomatic efforts began
to address the cause of this Haitian refugee situation, the
military continued to feed, house, clothe, and care for
Haitian refugees in Cuba (Matthews, 1993, p. 21). This
situation went on for over two years. Throughout this period
no transition of relief efforts to civilian relief agency
occurred, as the military was to retain this responsibility
(Matthews, 1993, p. 21).
H. UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS
The United Nations is a global organization made up of
approximately 180 nations that was established at the end of
World War II to promote international peace and security. The
United Nations officially came into existence on October 24,
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1945 when the 51 original members ratified its charter. The
main purposes of the organization was to provide a better
future for all nations; develop friendly relations among
states; cooperate in solving international economic, social,
cultural, and humanitarian problems; and promote respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms (Grolliers CD, 1992, p.
1 of 19)
.
In 1991, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2816,
which created the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief
Coordinator (UNDRO) . UNDRO would be the central coordinating
agency for the U.N. system for disaster relief. Its role
would be similar to that of the DOS's OFDA in coordinating the
interagency efforts for disaster relief, but at the interna-
tional level. Table 2-2 provides a list of the agencies
involved in the United Nation's disaster relief system.
The increasing number of disasters that are occurring have
placed a tremendous strain on the ability to respond by relief
agencies. The frequency of disaster occurrence reached such
a point that relief organizations described the situation this
way, "It's like the ten plagues, I just don't know where it
will hit next. I cannot recall a period in our collective
history when the challenges have been so great and our
resources stretched so thin." (Doherty, May 11, 1991, p.
1212) . In 1991, the U.N. Secretary-General in response to
41
TABLE 2-2













Office of the Emergency
Operations Coordinator
1971





























Source: Kent, "Anatomy Of Disaster Relief," 1987.
this development undertook an initiative to strengthen the
United Nation's system for providing humanitarian assistance.
He stated that for an international effort to be effective two
conditions were essential: (1) sufficient and readily avail-
able resources, and (2) improved coordination within the
system involving all the participants who provide humanitarian
assistance (United Nations, 1991, p. 421) . This U.N. initia-
tive made clear that change was needed in direction to ensure
effective coordination and funding for this challenge.
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Change would occur in another area of importance to the
U.N, there was a new world order unfolding as the Cold War had
ended. The role that the U.N. would play in maintaining
international peace and security among the nations of the
world would also be affected. The changed world order had
transformed from bipolar, involving the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
to multipolar, involving all regions of the world. The
previous threats of a superpower confrontation had given way
to regional conflicts for the world body to address. However,
now the U.N. could carry out its charter to maintain interna-
tional peace with a body of nations that could now work
together to solve emerging problems. The importance of the
U.N. peacekeeping role would definitely have to increase to
meet this challenge. The new world order would both present
new regional conflicts and allow existing conflicts to be
confronted in a collective effort. Many of these new
conflicts would involve civil war that would cause manmade
disasters. As : : ntified earlier, civil war has historically
hampered the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.
Despite saving lives and alleviating the suffering of
many, AID'S disaster assistance efforts cannot fully
resolve the crisis created by ongoing civil strife. In the
absence of peace, disaster assistance is only a stopgap
measure, and affected countries cannot fully recover and
benefit from reconstruction and development programs.
Diplomatic efforts are also required to established a
secure environment in which emergency relief supplies can
be distributed to those in need. (GAO, October 1992, p.
54)
In 1992, the Secretary-General introduced another initia-
tive to improve the United Nations. This time the subject was
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not disaster relief, but an issue related to it, ways to
improve the United Nation's capacity to improve diplomacy and
peacekeeping operations. (Loomis, 1993, p. 126) In his
report on the initiative, the Secretary-General outlined the
relationship between the changing world order and the emerging
expanded roles and functions for the United Nations. The
following list identifies those new roles and functions:
1. To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage
situations that could produce conflict, and try through
diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before
violence;
2. Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at
resolving the issues that have led to conflict;
3. Through peacekeeping, to work to preserve peace, however
fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in
implementation agreements achieved by the peacemakers;
4. To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its
differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and
infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife;
and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among
nations formerly at war;
5. And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes
of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and
political oppression. (Loomis, 1993, p. 127)
This proclamation for the U.N. , besides setting the agenda
for an increase in the role and number of U.N. peacekeeping
operations, would also generate considerable debate on the new
use of U.N. forces for peacemaking. The latter point on U.N.
peacemaking and the role of the DOD in this mission is an
issue beyond the scope of this thesis. However, all the
discussions on America's unique military capabilities to
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provide humanitarian assistance and its attendant costs are
germane to this issue.
Since 1988, the U.N. Security Council has approved
fourteen new operations as outlined above. This increase in
scope is significant when one considers that there had been
only thirteen such operations for the U.N. in the prior 40
years (United Nations, 1990, pp. 419-448) . The costs to
conduct these operations have also increased significantly.
In 1987, the total U.N. peacekeeping budget was $200 million.
In 1992, it was $2.5 billion, and it could increase to more
than $3.5 billion in 1993 (Vita, 1993, p. 4c). Table 2-3
outlines the fourteen active peacekeeping operations that have
almost 80,000 "blue helmets" deployed to all parts of the
globe. This increase in numbers and costs has become an issue
for those providing the forces to support these operations.
This topic will be addressed in the next chapter.
The authority and guidelines to use the military for
purposes of U.N. Peacekeeping operations are in the United
Nations Participation Act of 1945, which have been codified
into Title 22, Sections 287d and 2348. The authority to
furnish services and commodities directly to the U.N. on a
reimbursable basis is contained in Section 607 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Peacekeeping operations are
first established by the U.N. Security Council. DOS reviews
and approves all U.N. requests for U.S. assistance. In those
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cases where DOD support is required, DOS will request the
necessary support from DOD. However, DOS has the right to
waiver U.N. reimbursement to DOD, if it is in the national
interest. This authority has been exercised regularly by the
DOS as a means to reduce the U.S. obligation for its share of
U.N. peacekeeping costs (GAO, September 1992, pp. 30-3). The
DOS is also experiencing a strain on its budget in finding the
funds to cover the costs for all its increasing commitments.
These commitments, in which the military is becoming more
involved, range from disaster relief to U.N. peacekeeping.
I. APPLICATION OF A U.N. OPERATION
In Somalia, the deaths of tens of thousands; the flight of
hundreds of thousands of refugees into Ethiopia, Kenya,
Djibouti, and elsewhere; and the threat of starvation for
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millions is stark evidence of the international
community's failure, to date, to solve the crisis.
This observation is the concluding remark of an analysis
of foreign disaster assistance provided to Somalia in 1992
(GAO, October 1992, pp. 54-55). Congressional concern about
Somalia began to grow during the summer months of 1992 as
reports on the suffering reached catastrophic levels. Calls
for U.N. involvement in Somalia echoed in the chambers of
Congress. There was caution called for by the State
Department in any contemplated action for Somalia (Congres-
sional Quarterly, 1992, p. 535). Diplomatic concerns rested
on the lack of accord among the warring factions in the
country. The Senate finally passed a conference resolution on
August 3, 1992 urging the President to get the U.N. involved
in Somalia (Congressional Quarterly, 1992, p. 535). On August
14th, President Bush called upon the military to begin an
emergency airlift of humanitarian supplies to Somalia. This
operation would be known as Operation Provide Relief, the
first of three phases of military operations in support of
humanitarian assistance for Somalia.
Operation Provide Relief was mainly involved with the
distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. The military
would establish a transhipment point in Kenya for the receipt
and ultimate distribution of relief supplies to Somalia
(Interview I MEF, July 7, 1993). This phase of the operation
would continue until the decision was reached to expand the
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U.S. involvement in this humanitarian relief effort during
December 1992.
The initial efforts to provide humanitarian relief
supplies to those in need proved ineffective due to the
ongoing civil strife among the various clans involved in the
country's struggle to establish a new government. Somalia had
only recently disposed of its former political ruler. This
man, Muhammad Siad Barre, ruthlessly controlled Somalia and
laid the seeds for future unrest among the various clans. His
regime lasted from 1969-1991. Throughout this period Somalia
suffered many disasters. However, the efforts of U.S. relief
support would not begin until after Somalia expelled its
Soviet advisors in 1977 (Grolliers (CD), 1992, p. 15).
Siad Barre was driven from power in 1991 by the uprising
of the various Somalia clans. The success of removing one
dictator from the country was overshadowed by the chaos that
was to be created by the in-fighting among the clans. This
civil unrest created a situation in which 30 percent of the
Somalia's population faced starvation, and compelled the U.N.
to become involved. (Grolliers (CD), 1992, p. 16). This U.N.
involvement took the form of a U.N. peacekeeping operation
that was limited to 500 men and restricted in its ability to
deal with an on going civil war. Traditional U.N. peace-
keeping operations are based on the consent and cooperation of
the host nation involved. The primary weapon of the peace-
keepers is their international status and their international
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support. Their rules of engagement do not authorize proactive
combat roles but rather peaceful conflict resolution tech-
niques. As Operation Provide Hope would experience, no
effective relief support could be provided as long as civil
war was present.
The situation in Somalia would again captivate the
public's conscious as scenes on television would show the
suffering of the children, as was the case during Operation
Provide Comfort. President Bush would communicate in November
1992 to the U.N. that he was prepared to lead a multi-national
effort to provide security for the relief mission in Somalia.
On 3 December 1991, the U.N. would finally pass a resolution
on Somalia.
The key points of this resolution were:
1. Recognizes "the unique character" of the "human tragedy"
in Somalia and says it requires "an immediate and
exceptional response,"
2. Welcomes the U.S. offer as well as "offers by other
member states to participate in that operation;"
3. Authorizes the U.N. Secretary-General "and member states
cooperating to implement the offer referred to... above
to use all necessary means to establish as soon as




The resolution also left open the time to be decided
when the decision would be made for the transition to
U.N. peacekeeping operations (Towell, 1991, p. 3762).
The significant aspect of this resolution was the
authority to use force to carry out this U.N. peacekeeping
mission. The role of peacemakers for U.N. sponsored troops
would now find its beginnings in Somalia. The U.N. also
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accepted a U.S offer to lead a joint task force in Somalia
with the mission of providing a secure environment to allow
humanitarian aid to be distributed. This U.S. initiative
would have the military remain under U.S. command, as was the
case in Operation Provide Comfort. Under this arrangement the
cost of this phase of the operation would be borne by the
United States as part of a multi-national force. A Special
U.N. Somalia Trust Fund based on voluntary contributions was
established to finance, as required, the participation of
other coalition forces in this operation. (Interview I MEF
Comptroller, 1993)
In early December 1992, President Bush would announce that
he would send approximately 28,000 troops to Somalia to ensure
that the needed humanitarian relief supplies reached the
people who desperately needed it. In his address to the
American people on 4 Dec 1992, he would outline his intent for
this mission.
Only the United States has the global reach to place a
large security force on the ground in such a distance
place, quickly and efficiently, and thus save thousands of
innocents from death. ... We will create a secure
environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia, so that
food can move from ships overland to the people in the
countryside now devastated by starvation. . . . Once we have
created that secure environment, we will withdraw our
troops, handing the security mission back to a regular
U.N. peacekeeping force. (Towell, 1993, p. 536).
So would begin the second phase of the Somalia operation.
It would be called Operation Restore Hope to U.S. troops and
United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM I) to U.N. forces.
This operation, like the one conducted during Operation
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Provide Comfort, was characterized by a host country that
lacked an adequate infrastructure to support relief efforts.
Due to the mission requirements, all aspects of the military's
capability would be called upon to support this effort. The
operation would commence with an amphibious assault conducted
by Marines and supported by Navy carrier air to secure the
port and airfield of Mogadishu, the capitol of Somalia. After
that, Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) would begin their
offloading of supplies and equipment to support the Fly-In-
Echelon (FIE) of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. An Army
brigade would follow shortly and the Air Force would begin
operations out of Mogadishu.
The use of MPS assets proved essential in providing
initial support in a region that lacked any form of host
nation support. This was not the first time that MPS assets
had been used to support humanitarian assistance. MPS was
used to support the disaster relief efforts in both Mount
Pinatubo, Philippines and Typhoon Omar, Guam. A contributing
factor to this MPS success was the prior planning and training
conducted in this area by DOD.
This phase of the operation, 4 Dec 1992 until 4 May 1993,
achieved success in securing the area and ensuring that relief
supplies reached people in need. One aspect of the opera-
tion's success was the negotiations held in early December
1991 with the warring clans to help the humanitarian relief
actions of the military force (Towell, 1993, p. 537). The
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concept of operations for the JTF during Operation Restore
Hope was:
1. Phase I - Establish lodgements/security for relief
operations in Mogadishu.
2. Phase II - Expand security operations to major
interior relief centers/lines of
communication
.
3. Phase III - Continue expansion and stabilize interior
relief centers.
4. Phase IV - Relief in place of U.S. and coalition
forces by U.N. peacekeeping forces.
The mission of the U.S. forces broadened as the operation
developed. What started out as one of providing protection
for the delivery of relief supplies progressed to one that
included seizing weapons and repairing some of the war damaged
facilities.
In May 1993, the operation entered its third phase under
U.N. control and is known as UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II continues
as this thesis is being written. One of the unique features
of this phase of the operation is that some of the U.S.
troops in the area around Somalia are now under U.N. command.
These American troops are primarily logistical and number
close to 4,000. The transition of peacekeeping responsibility
for Somalia to the U.N. follows the same course as occurred in
Operation Provide Comfort. It demonstrated that only the
U.S., or a joint coalition such as NATO, has the military
capability to conduct effective peacemaking. At this same
time, the Pentagon would announce that it would send 3 00
troops to join an international force to Macedonia in an
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effort to contain the strife in the former Yugoslavia. (Vita,
1993, p. lc)
This involvement in Yugoslavia would not be the first one
for DOD. The U.S. began airdrops of humanitarian relief
supplies to Bosnia and set up a military Army field hospital
in Croatia early in 1993 (Interview with Carrigan July 14,
1993) . However, the U.S. has not committed any ground troops
to the on-going U.N. peacekeeping operations in Bosnia at this
time. The U.N. peacekeeping operation is overseeing the
delivery of humanitarian supplies on the ground, but it is not
engaging in any peacemaking actions, as is occurring in
Somalia. As is the case in Somalia, Bosnia is experiencing a
civil war that is causing a man-made disaster. Another
parallel with Somalia is the impotent U.N. efforts to
distribute humanitarian supplies. The peacekeeping force
lacks the capability to provide the required security for
this mission. United States attempts to formulate a coalition
response with its NATO allies to Bosnia as was done in
Operation Provide Comfort failed last year. Although the
American public is sensitive to the plight of the human
suffering in Bosnia, Congress has indicated its desire to
limit the employment of military forces for U.N. peacekeeping
operations. Congressional concern has grown as the risks of
such operations becoming costly in terms of lives and funding
responsibility have increased. This current political
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situation is developing as the U.N. is in the process of
defining its role in this new world order.
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided an historical overview to the
programs and agencies involved with humanitarian relief
efforts. An example of the military's involvement in each
type of humanitarian mission was provided. In all cases except
domestic disaster relief, coordination is required between DOD
and DOS. This interagency process of coordinating humani-
tarian assistance within the federal government has not always
proven effective. Recent operations have shown that the
frequency and scale of involvement in these new types of
humanitarian missions are increasing. The military has
demonstrated the ability to conduct planning at the CINC level
to prepare for these new humanitarian missions. It has also
adapted to the experience gained from each mission. Only
recently, DOD unveiled a new Meal Ready Eat (MRE) developed
specifically for humanitarian operations. Admiral Miller, the
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, wrote a paper
in 1992 on the subject of the military roles in the 1990s. He
wrote that the "requirement is not doing more with less but
doing better with our currently unmatched capabilities." The
challenges of this vision DOD has meet in responding to the
missions for humanitarian assistance. As the examples
outlined in this chapter demonstrated, the importance of
integrating all resources as a team in a joint, coalition, or
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multi-agency operation is the key to success. What has not
kept pace with this trend is the process to both fund and
improve coordination for these unprogrammed humanitarian
missions. As the last example illustrated, the role of the
U.S. in both peacekeeping and peacemaking operations continues





If we are going to do more Somalias - and presumably when
you look around the world there is an awful lot more
places that the same thing could happen, how are we going
to establish a funding mechanism so that the American
taxpayer is not stuck with the whole bill? Les Aspen
(Palmer, 1993, p. 186)
When an operation such as Provide Hope in Somalia is
undertaken, what is the process that must be contemplated to
fund such a mission? What is the fair "burden share" to be
divided among coalition forces? There are many answers to
these questions. The U.S. government has several different
processes, each of which is triggered by some forcing
mechanism that is based on disaster relief, humanitarian
assistance or peacekeeping. In addition, factors such as the
size and duration of the operation are important in deciding
which funding procedures to follow. Federal funding is always
subject to the distribution of limited resources. This
applies equally to U.N. sanctioned operations. Because of a
tight budget for foreign affairs, the State Department has
become more insistent that the Pentagon pick up part of the
tab for international programs, such as U.S. contributions for
U.N. peacekeeping operations.
In the U.S., all funding must follow the Budget Enforcement
Act (BEA) of 1990. In its most basic form, this Act specifies
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federal limits for discretionary spending. This requires that
any supplemental appropriations for humanitarian assistance
must come at the expense of other programs or be designated an
emergency by the President and Congress. An example of an
emergency would be House Resolution 1281. This was a 1991
supplemental appropriation bill that was used to pay for the
indirect costs of the Persian Gulf War. President Bush
requested $3.7 billion, of which $940 million was to be
considered exempt from the discretionary caps. The amount not
designated as an emergency fund would be added to the
discretionary spending totals. Regular appropriation bills
must then be reduced to fit additional spending in supple-
mental appropriations bills. (Doyle, 1992, p. 10)
This chapter will outline the current funding procedures
(focusing on the second research question) in place to support
DOD involvement in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief
and peacekeeping operations. Also, this chapter will describe
how funding flows within the Department of Defense for humani-
tarian assistance operations. The supplemental appropriation
process will be addressed, as well as its effect on Operations
and Maintenance accounts within the Services. The govern-
ment's formal organizational structure, under the control of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs, will also
be presented. In addition, the newly proposed Global
Cooperatives Initiative and guidelines for humanitarian
assistance funding are included to give an overview of the
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courses of action that can be expected in the short-term for
humanitarian assistance operations. United Nations funding
policies are then outlined which demonstrate the unique
attention that must be given to U.N. sponsored peacekeeping
operations.
B. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION - BUSINESS AS USUAL
Typically, funding for large operations conducted by the
Department of Defense will eventually be approved through the
supplemental appropriation process. Initial funding is taken
from Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts to begin
operations. This method offsets the timing delay that is
inherent in the appropriation process. If the costs are
significant, fiscal constraints may develop that effect the
operational readiness of the units supporting the action.
Scheduled training and maintenance must sometimes be cancelled
or postponed because of reduced funding. According to Defense
Secretary Les Aspin, the services have had to raid their
training funds and other readiness-related budget accounts to
cover the costs when operations are taken on short notice.
This is usually the case when operations begin close to the
end of the fiscal year. New sources of funding are harder to
find in later fiscal quarters as the majority of the budget
dollars have already been obligated.
The supplemental appropriation process routinely causes
political controversy, as funds must either be reallocated
from other sources, or more debt must be incurred. For
example, in Somalia, President Bush proposed to reduce
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research grants earmarked for universities and colleges
throughout the country that Congress had already included in
the 1993 Defense Appropriation Bill. The funding was to be
reallocated to pay for the unanticipated expenses caused by
Operation Provide Hope in Somalia. The opposition in Congress
argued against dropping the grants, since in many cases the
money would have gone to their constituents. Besides the
grants, Bush proposed transferring to the Somalia operation
$248 million that had been slated to buy eight C-130 cargo
planes that were to be stationed in the home state of Rep.
Bill Hefner. (Congressional Quarterly, July 1992, pp. 537-
538) This scenario illustrates the fact that the supplemental
appropriations are often the subject of debate and not
completely reliable. The supplemental appropriation process
can be lengthy and does not relieve the problem of short-term
funding.
Does the controversy over funding mean that DOD components
will never get reimbursed for operations? No, in most medium
and large-scale operations supplemental appropriations have
eventually been approved. The problem is the time lag between
operations and reimbursement. Operations and Maintenance
budgets are allocated on a quarterly basis. In Somalia, when
Marine Corps O&M funds scheduled for the fourth quarter had
already been spent by the second quarter, the planning process
became disrupted later in the year. The Marine Expeditionary
Force arrived back in the United States, in May 1993, with its
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O&M funding for the rest of the fiscal year already allocated.
This influenced operational readiness as units became finan-
cially unable to conduct previously scheduled training and
maintenance.
The bottom line is that funding the increasing number of
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance programs has been,
inefficient, and often has been provided at the expense of
other DOD programs. In FY 1992, an estimated $42 million was
absorbed into the Services' regular Operations and Maintenance
appropriation for incremental costs of DOD support for various
U.N. operations. Additionally, in FY 1992, DOD incurred costs
for some humanitarian assistance activities, and received
regular or supplemental appropriations for others. Although
DOD has the authority to undertake humanitarian assistance
operations, non-supplemental appropriations have not been
provided for such activities on a regular basis. In practice
the costs for such operations are reallocated from Operations
and Maintenance appropriations.
C. DOD STRUCTURE FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Within the Department of Defense there is a formalized
hierarchy set up to coordinate humanitarian assistance. This
is managed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Global Affairs. Beginning in 1994, responsibility for humani-
tarian assistance operations will be transferred to a newly
created, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Democracy and Peacekeeping. The Office of the Assistant
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Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping will be
the focal point for all future operations. This office has
the responsibility for managing the account appropriation and
has defined its future priorities as:
1. To develop and refine strategies for regional and
country priorities for delivery of DOD excess property,
privately donated supplies, and other relief assistance;
2. To improve the efficiency, effectiveness and timing of
DOD's humanitarian and disaster relief assistance
programs by reviewing and improving upon programs and
procedures, and to assist crisis prevention efforts;
3. To facilitate contingency planning with other U.S.
government, international, and non-governmental




To expand cooperative relationships with the United
Nations, other international, and private volunteer
organizations to facilitate or assist non-government and
humanitarian assistance efforts. (OASD, June 1993, pp.
4-5)
It will be the responsibility of the new Assistant
Secretary to direct, manage and coordinate all humanitarian
assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping activities.
Below is a description of each program under the authority of
this office.
1. Humanitarian Assistance Program
The Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance
Program (HAP) , which distributes excess supplies, has been the
historical approach for humanitarian assistance provided by
the U.S. military. This program is expected to become more
important as military forces are being reduced and bases
closed, causing substantial increases in DOD excess property
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available to meet ongoing humanitarian assistance require-
ments. (Touma, July 1993, p. 10)
The Defense Act of 1986, authorized the Humanitarian
Assistance Program (also called the excess property program)
,
under which the Secretary of Defense can make available for
humanitarian relief purposes any non-lethal excess supplies in
the DOD system. The purpose of the program was to donate
excess property to help refugee and resistance groups in
Afghanistan, and to fly wounded Afghans requiring surgery to
the United States and Europe. The first flight of supplies
was sent in March 1986. Subsequently, in 1987 the program was
expanded to include resistance groups in Cambodia. Requests
for excess supplies and equipment are usually originated by
U.S. Embassies, and sent via the State Department to the
Department of Defense. After DOD fills the request, it ships
the property overseas, and then transfers the property to a
State Department representative. The representative in
country receiving the property is responsible for its
distribution. (GAO, 1991, p. 1)
In addition to excess supplies, the Humanitarian
Assistance Program has a variety of complementing programs
that also use DOD resources to meet humanitarian assistance
requirements. Currently, the program provides for transporta-
tion costs of defense excess materials and supplies from the
private nonprofit donor community for humanitarian, refugee,
and disaster relief purposes. DOD's unique transportation
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assets and excess property, including food, medical supplies,
clothing, tents, heavy equipment, trucks, and other non-lethal
equipment, are made available through designated or space-
available transportation to eligible recipients when other
traditional means of U.S. support are not adequate. (GAO,
January 1991, p. 3)
2. Denton Space Available Program
The Humanitarian Assistance Office also coordinates
the execution of the Denton Space-Available Transportation
Program (annual funding for this program is approximately $15
million) which provides space available transport for
privately donated cargo aboard military aircraft. Transporta-
tion costs have historically required the greatest percentage
of humanitarian assistance funds. Using room on existing
flights helps to control humanitarian assistance funds without
adding to the incremental costs associated with it. This
authority is the only legal means for U.S. military aircraft
to transport private cargo at no cost to third parties.
3. Title 10 Humanitarian Assistance Funding
This is administered by the CINCs, but approved by the
Humanitarian Assistance Office. Under this program, military
forces complete civic assistance projects while on training
exercises and deployments in foreign countries. Funding is
provided by the DOD Executive Agent for each CINC and is based
on CINC requests to the Executive Agent. Authorized funding
for this program has averaged $3.3 million per year. This
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program is a goodwill activity that does not effect the
unanticipated requirements of humanitarian assistance
operations.
4. Emergency Response Fund
Another potential source of funding is the Emergency
Response Fund (ERF) . This is a revolving account used to fund
supplies and services provided by DOD for humanitarian
assistance. The advantage of the ERF is that it can be useful
to fund humanitarian assistance, although reimbursements from
other agencies have proven difficult to obtain. The language
establishing this fund states:
The fund should be available for providing reimbursement
to currently applicable appropriations of the Department
of Defense for supplies and services provided in anticipa-
tion of requests from Federal Departments and agencies and
from state and local governments for assistance on a
reimbursable basis to respond to natural or manmade
disasters. The fund may be used upon a determination by
the Secretary of Defense that immediate action is
necessary before a formal request is received. Reimburse-
ments and appropriations deposited to the fund shall
remain available until expended. (Carrigan, 1993, pp. 1-
3)
The Emergency Response Fund was established by Congress in
1990. A total of $100 million was appropriated. The Army is
the Executive Agent for the ERF. An example of an operation
in which this fund was used is Operation Sea Angel in
Bangladesh. The operations were funded by each military
component from O&M funds with the assurance of reimbursement.
All O&M funding provided by the parent Services for Operation
Sea Angel were then reimbursed through the U.S. Army, acting
as executive agent (in this case, $6.35 million). It was the
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responsibility of the Army to request that DOD release funds
for reimbursement purposes. (Stackpole, 1991, p. 3)
5. Foreign Disaster Assistance Program
The Department of Defense has been involved in
disaster relief around the globe. In response to tasking
through the Joint Staff, with approval from the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, individual military units may provide
personnel or resources to respond to the needs of a disaster
stricken region or country. When a CINC provides disaster
relief, the funding is provided through the component
commanders, who use internal O&M funds for assistance,
generally without reimbursement. These operations are carried
out in response to Joint Staff taskings to the CINCs.
Requests to provide foreign disaster assistance are
coordinated by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA) in the Agency for International Development (AID)
.
During the 1980s, OFDA's spending grew without a corresponding
increase in annual disaster assistance appropriations. To
meet its funding requirements, OFDA increasingly relied on its
borrowing authority. However, consistent use of borrowing
authority alters congressional priorities by shifting funds
from development assistance to disaster assistance outside the
normal annual budgeting process.
Until FY 1992, DOD provided foreign disaster relief
without benefit of a specific appropriation. Often, the State
Department reimbursed DOD for a wide range of specifically
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requested activities. The number and scope of DOD's involve-
ment in conducting foreign disaster relief has been steadily
increasing. As its role has grown, the Department of Defense
has expressed a growing concern over obtaining funds for
humanitarian assistance. In exceptional cases where large-
scale military involvement was required to conduct foreign
disaster relief activities, DOD funds were reprogrammed or
transferred from other DOD accounts.
In FY 1992, Congress, recognizing that DOD had been
absorbing increased unplanned costs in conducting foreign
disaster relief assistance, began approving specific appro-
priations to fund disaster relief activities. Also in FY
1992, a $25 million appropriation was passed to reimburse
military units for the unanticipated costs of providing
foreign disaster relief assistance. In FY 1993, a separate
additional appropriation was also approved to mitigate the
costs of DOD conducting foreign disaster relief worldwide. An
important new activity that is being funded by this $50
million appropriation is the procurement of items such as food
and medicines. (Touma, July 1993, pp. 2-3)
6. CINC Initiative Fund
This is a revolving account controlled by the JCS. It
can be used to help streamline the funding process to
component commanders for the reimbursement of humanitarian
assistance operations. The current annual funding level for
this program is $25 million. This approach to funding
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operations is extremely efficient, but, seven other CINC
activities compete for this funding. With the amount
available the fund can only be made available for operations
that are limited in scope and cost. The idea, if expanded,
has the potential to alleviate much of the funding problems.
D. GLOBAL COOPERATIVES INITIATIVE FUNDING PROPOSAL
Included in the 1994 budget proposal is the Global
Cooperatives Initiative (GCI) Appropriation. This proposed
$448 million package captures the peacekeeping, humanitarian,
and disaster assistance and democratization programs in a
single, centralized transfer account. The Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping will have the
responsibility for monitoring these funds. The amount
requested for the Global Cooperatives Initiative would cover
many activities in which U.S. forces have previously been
engaged, such as participation in international peacekeeping
operations. In the past, the Services usually had to pay for
the costs of such measures out of their own budgets, and they
often had to cutback on training as a result. These funds
will be made available as two-year appropriations to maintain






Promotion of Democracy 50
Total $ 448
This program is a first step to streamline the funding
process so that military departments would not have to cancel
or defer other programs to fit the costs associated with such
initiatives. The idea is to minimize the impact on Operations
and Maintenance appropriations, thus protecting funds for
operational readiness. The Global Cooperatives Initiative
Appropriation also will provide DOD greater flexibility to
respond quickly to events with appropriate capabilities by
reducing the time-consuming decision process over the source
of funding for each action. The funding levels for the Global
Cooperative Initiative are to remain constant over five years.
(OASD, June 1993, p. 516)
FY95 FY95-99 (millions)
Peacekeeping $ 300 $ 1500
Humanitarian Assistance 50 250
Disaster Relief 50 250
Promotion of Democracy 50 250
Total $ 2250
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While $2.25 billion may seem like a lot of money, it will
probably fall well short of what will be required. Operation
Provide Hope in Somalia cost over $750 million. That is
significantly more than the total 1994 appropriation. As
humanitarian assistance programs are integrated into the force
structure of the military it is apparent that the funding
requirement for operations should be increasing over the near
term instead of remaining constant. There is little doubt
that the Global Cooperatives Initiative Appropriation will
alleviate some strain currently felt by the service
components, however, other programs will also be necessary to
meet increasing commitments.
Transportation and other costs are expected to increase
further as greater numbers of international and non-
governmental organizations seek DOD support for their various
humanitarian assistance programs. DOD humanitarian activities
in Northern Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Bosnia outline not
only a likely increase in the number of manmade disasters in
the 1990s as regional instabilities are aggravated, but also
the likelihood that DOD will be called upon to play a
significant role in subsequent relief efforts. (Touma, July
1993, p. 3)
All DOD humanitarian and disaster relief activities funded
by the Global Cooperatives Initiative are conducted at the
request of the State Department. The breakdown among these
two components of the package is as follows:
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Humanitarian Assistance $48 million
Excess Property Donations 4
Transportation Assistance 44
Disaster Relief $50 million
Planning and Training 3
Relief and Rehabilitation 40
Reconstruction 7
These types of humanitarian assistance programs are to be
expected of future military operations. In many cases
operations are outpacing the funding programs that are in
place to support them. Component commanders cannot
automatically look to the CINC to cover their costs. This
time-consuming process greatly affects operational readiness
as it limits the use of O&M funds. In small scale operations
the impact of conducting operations with O&M funds and finding
reimbursement may not be a problem. This, however, is no
longer the normal situation. The size and scope of humani-
tarian operations are increasing. Despite anticipated program
growth, funding is to be held constant each year at $50
million for humanitarian assistance and $50 million for
disaster relief through 1999. This leaves the supplemental
process as the only method available to recover expenses
(OASD, June 1993, p. 518).
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E. UNITED NATIONS INVOLVED FUNDING
The United Nations is currently involved in an effort to
rewrite and clarify its reimbursement procedures for
peacekeeping operations. The U.N. realizes that there is a
need for a central funding mechanism to ensure the provision
of adequate resources in peacekeeping operations. The
Secretary-General has proposed that, under his authority, a
central emergency revolving fund (in the amount of $50
million) be established that would act as a cash-flow
mechanism to ensure the rapid and coordinated response of
participating states.
A major lesson learned to date is that the United States
must develop an interface with the U.N. system and not expect
the U.N. system to accommodate ours. In Somalia, failure to
comply with the U.N. system made reimbursement difficult,
since the necessary procedures to identify costs were not in
place early in the operation. Other U.N. operations face the
same problems, primarily because the ground rules were not
known when operations started, and sometimes the parties
involved were not aware that the operation was reimbursable.
It is important that the logistical commander in the field be
provided the guidance and information necessary to establish
a reimbursement baseline and to minimize non-reimbursable




Funding for U.N. peacekeeping operations are presently
obtained from the following sources:
1. Regular U.N. budget;
2
.
Assessed contributions in accordance with a formula
determined by the General Assembly; and
3. Voluntary contributions.
When calculating the costs that may be charged to the
U.N. , it is the general practice only to seek recovery of the
additional costs that fall to the state contributing troops.
In some cases this will equal the full cost of providing a
service. Where capital purchase is necessary, the full cost
is appropriate. Full visibility of all costs that are to be
the subject of reimbursement by the U.N. will be required if
payment is to be authorized. In this regard, lack of
supporting documentation will likely result in a significant
delay or even nonpayment. (Joint Staff, 1993, pp. 1, 4)
Under the formula for peacekeeping dues, the United States
pays 30.4 percent of each mission. U.N. Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali has estimated annual peacekeeping costs will
rise to $3.6 billion by the end of 1993. That would put the
U.S. bill at nearly $1.1 billion. This is significantly more
than the 25 percent that the U.S. is assessed annually for the
general U.N. budget. Under a 25 percent guideline the cost to




All of the funding programs managed by the Office of
Humanitarian Assistance have central guidelines that must be
followed to acquire resources. It is important for component
commanders to be aware of their options in obtaining funding.
Costs to the U.S. military will depend on the size and type of
forces that may be deployed to support humanitarian assistance
operations.
When operating under the U.N. flag for peacekeeping or
humanitarian assistance operations it is important to identify
reimbursable costs (see Appendix D for list) . Most U.N.
operations will result in incremental costs to DOD that
involve military personnel (such as family separation pay) and
transportation expenses. In a 1993 Bottom-Up Review by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy, Resources and
Requirements) several illustrative examples of force packages
and their approximate incremental costs were outlined. These
included:
1. Deployment of an engineer battalion to an African
country for six months: $77 million.
2. Deployment of 4000 logistics support troops to an
African country for 12 months: $100 million.
3. Humanitarian airlift to Europe/Asia for three months:
$52 million.
4. Deployment of 5000 special forces troops to Middle East
for 6 months: $127 million.
5. Deployment of 4 000 logistics support troops to Eastern
Europe for 12 months: $157 million.
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6. Deployment of an Amphibious Task Group to an Asian
country for 2 months: $11 million (OASD, June 199 3, pp.
14-15)
These costs are only illustrative; anticipated costs must
be incorporated into budget planning to support overall
Defense Strategy.
Most of the programs within the Office of Humanitarian
Assistance are only designed to provide resources for
activities that are limited in scope and size. Therefore,
committing a unit of any significant size to a United Nations
operation would entail more resources then any one of the
programs under the structure of the Department of Defense
could handle. However, projecting requirements based on a
changing world environment rather than maintaining funding at
a steady measure over the next five years, as in the case of
the Global Cooperatives Initiative Appropriation, would seem
more appropriate. Direct estimates of operational costs need
to be incorporated into any type of appropriation planning
process. This is particularly important in the case of the
GCI or any similar program designed to streamline the funding
process.
G. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE IN U.N. OPERATIONS
The State Department is responsible for overseeing U.S.
interests in U.N. operations that involve the Department of
Defense. Within the State Department, there is a division of
responsibility for the political and financial dimensions of
humanitarian assistance operations. The DOD supports U.N.
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operations with services such as military airlift, logistics,
and military personnel. The State Department receives
requests from the United Nations, and then coordinates with
DOD to provide assistance. In return for providing assistance
the State Department receives credits toward the U.S. assess-
ment for the value of its military contribution.
The Department of Defense and the State Department are
often in disagreement over reimbursement policies. According
to a recent General Accounting Office study, Department of
Defense policies for reporting support are outdated. Further,
DOD has not been reporting the cost of its peacekeeping
operations because it felt that there was no requirement to do
so. As a result, the State Department often will not
reimburse DOD for its contribution. What credits the State
Department does receive from the United Nations instead is
applied to the United States' portion of the U.N. General
Assessment. (GAO, 1992, p. 3)
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has outlined the formalized structure within
DOD for humanitarian assistance funding. The Global Coopera-
tives Initiative is the Defense Department's solution for
avoiding delay in identifying funding every time a new mission
arises. The acknowledgement that an appropriation of this
type will fall short of actual requirements necessitates that
component commanders and individual Services still be aware of
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all the programs and guidelines available to support humani-
tarian assistance operations. Current funding for humani-
tarian assistance operation is outlined in various programs
controlled by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Global Affairs. These programs include the Humanitarian
Assistance Program, Foreign Disaster Assistance Program,
Emergency Response Fund, and the CINC Initiative Fund.
Coordination between many of the programs is often limited or
under tight bureaucratic controls. A more effective funding
system might incorporate the use of a centralized point of
contact that could reduce unnecessary duplication, and seek a
synergistic effect for all types of operations.
Funding for U.N. operations is coordinated through the
State Department for the Department of Defense. The State
Department receives credits from the U.N. for the value of DOD
contributions, and in turn is supposed to reimburse the
Defense Department for the amount of the credits. The State
Department has been reluctant to reimburse DOD because of
conflicting political and financial interests within the State
Department, and inadequate policies and procedures by which
DOD accounts for the value of humanitarian assistance.
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IV. SOMALIA COST PROFILE
A. OVERVIEW
Given the increasing demands for DOD assistance to U.N.
peacekeeping operations, it is essential that the full
value of U.S. contributions and reimbursable billings be
accurately determined and reported. To date there is no
single unit within the Department of Defense tasked with
compiling and maintaining such records (Senate Report 103-
112, July 27, 1993, p. 337).
The above Congressional statement highlights the present
situation facing DOD in its attempts to deal with the budget
implications of humanitarian operations. Historically, the
costs associated with these types of missions have fallen
within the range of Congressional authorized spending limits.
However, as we have witnessed the dramatic increase in
frequency and scale of such operations their costs have
exceeded authorized levels. As the Services fund these
contingency missions from their own budgets, the importance of
identifying and reporting the costs incurred for future
reimbursements becomes critical.
DOD is currently updating the policies and procedures for
reporting costs and determining reimbursement procedures for
these non-traditional operations. This process of revising
fiscal procedures to reflect the methods of employing our
armed forces for conducting humanitarian missions is a
challenge. Reimbursement procedures established under one
situation, like that for an NATO multinational force, may
prove cumbersome between countries under a U.N. sponsored
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operation. A U.N. sponsored operation can have up to 180
different countries involved. Reimbursement procedures for a
single item of support in a U.N. situation could involve many
varying fiscal arrangements.
During Operation Provide Comfort, the coalition force was
composed of NATO countries. Usually, existing NATO mutual
support agreements covered the provisions required for
reimbursement for cross-service support among the coalition
members. In other cases, prior Section 607 agreements under
the Foreign Assistance Act with other coalition members were
invoked for reimbursement. Regarding the funding for the U.S.
military involvement in the operation, existing Congression-
ally authorized funding levels proved to be insufficient and
restrictive. As we now appreciate, Operation Provide Comfort
was the first large-scale humanitarian mission undertaken by
the military. Its impact on the Services' operating budget
would be minimal, since it was only the first of many humani-
tarian missions to follow. Also, "excess" funds from Opera-
tion Desert Storm were available to finance the operation.
The only impact on DOD funding caused by Operation Provide
Comfort was the timing for obligating the Service's O&M funds
for the conduct of the operation. The operation occurred
during the third quarter and the O&M accounts were already
programmed for third and fourth quarter obligations. Funding
from the supplemental did not require the Services to re-
program existing O&M appropriations to pay for the operation.
79
As the examples of DOD humanitarian missions in Chapter II
showed, these operations are being conducted as part of either
a multi-national or U.N. sponsored operation. Often, DOD
provides support to other coalition forces for these opera-
tions. These requests originate from the fact that many
countries do not possesses the capability to project and
sustain a large military force. This is one unique capability
of the U.S. military. A recent GAO report on U.S. participa-
tion in U.N. peacekeeping operations, identified several
issues that impact on DOD peacekeeping contributions. The
following list highlights those issues:
1. DOD logistic support procedures are outdated and are not
being applied correctly for U.N. reimbursement.
2. Since 1989, DOS has waived DOD reimbursement for U.N.
airlift support. Instead the reimbursement is used to
credit U.S. peacekeeping assessment.
3. DOD lacks current policies and procedures to track and
report peacekeeping assistance (GAO, September 1992, pp.
30-33)
.
This report provides the background that motivated the debate
in the Senate Report highlighted at the beginning of this
chapter. These GAO findings occurred after the beginning of
Operation Provide Comfort but before Operation Restore Hope.
Attempts to get historical data on Operation Provide Comfort
for this thesis provided only limited data.
This chapter will provide a profile of the costs reported
for Operation Restore Hope. The cost data covers the five-
month period from December 1992 until the U.N. turnover in May
1993. Cost data is broken down by Service and cost category.
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A comparison of the actual and estimated costs for Operation
Restore Hope will be presented. The process of developing a
supplemental appropriation to fund this operation is
presented. The significance of reviewing the costs involved
in Somalia is that the operation involved the U.S. in both a
multi-national and U.N. peacekeeping operation. This opera-
tion also pointed out the weaknesses of a large scale U.N.
humanitarian operation without the help of the U.S. military.
Operation Restore Hope is now the largest and costliest
military deployment for a humanitarian mission. An under-
standing of the cost elements for Operation Restore Hope can
provide some insights for future humanitarian budget planning.
By its very nature, humanitarian operations will occur as a
contingency mission. This fact underscores the inherent
problem of budgeting for these unprogrammed requirements. As
described in Chapter III, the Services provide their own O&M
funds to initially fund the operation's cost. The process for
supplemental reimbursements may take months, as occurred in
Somalia. The need to account for all costs involved in an
operation is critical for receiving reimbursements from a
supplemental appropriation or funds from other sources.
Somalia can be characterized as a model for future humani-
tarian operations. It required DOD to use all aspects of its
military capabilities to conduct the operation in an austere
environment. This latter point coupled with the funding
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issues involved, provides information that can be used to plan
future humanitarian budgeting requirements.
B. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE COST PROFILE
The Administration made these deployments and didn't
figure out how to pay for them, and now they're trying to
come back and hurt our military effectiveness. (Schmitt,
January 17, 1993, p. 17:1)
This was Representative John Murtha's reaction to
President Bush's, January 12, 1993, proposed "zero-sum"
supplemental appropriation to cover the costs for Operation
Restore Hope. This zero-sum proposal would fund the
operation's estimated costs from existing appropriations in
DOD. The request proposed transferring $560 million in FY
1993 DOD appropriations and $23.2 million in realized cost
reductions to finance the operation. This supplemental
request would be the first of the initiatives to fund this
operation. It was the administration's intention to conclude
and transfer responsibility for this operation to the U.N. in
March 1993. The supplemental identified $583.2 million in
estimated incremental costs for the operation. This figure
was based on an estimate of deploying 28,600 personnel for 90
days. The estimate equates to an average daily cost rate of
approximately $226.57 per man. This cost estimate did not
include any costs associated with providing support to
coalition forces. These costs were to be reimbursed by either
the U.N. Somalia Trust fund or existing support agreements in
force with other nations.
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The cost estimates identified in the proposed supplemental
applied to the following DOD military appropriations:
Personnel, Operation & Maintenance, and Defense Business
Operating Fund (DBOF) . The Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
uses the DBOF to finance its operations. The proposed source
of funding to finance these incremental costs would come from
offsetting decreases within the DOD budget. This supplemental
requested the authority to transfer these internal DOD funds.
Appendix D contains a summary of the proposed supplemental.
Table 4-1 provides the Services' inputs for the estimated
incremental costs associated with the personnel appropriation.
Personnel cost estimates include the following categories:
Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) , Family Separation Allowance (FSA)
,
Foreign Duty Pay (FDP) , and reservists who receive pay and
allowances. The rates used for estimating personnel cost
were: IDP - $150 man/month, FSA - $75 man/month, and FDP - $25
man/month. Pay and allowance cost for volunteer reservists is
based on their rank and location of active duty. Similarly,
the cost for Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) , which is
authorized in garrison, is based on the rank structure. BAS
costs would be deducted here, since Somalia is a field duty.












Marine Corps 11.4 120
Air Force 23.8 2300
Other DOD 8.3 NA
Total 46.30 2,888
Source: I MEF Comptroller
The largest incremental cost area in support of Operation
Restore Hope would be in the Operation & Maintenance appropri-
ation and the DBOF for TRANSCOM. Table 4-2 provides the
Service's estimate of the incremental costs associated with
the Operation & Maintenance appropriation.
TABLE 4-2
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE COST ESTIMATES ($MILLIONS)







Source: I MEF Comptroller
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The Operation & Maintenance cost estimates include the
following categories:
1. Subsistence - This category covers Class I food and
water.
2. In Country Sustainment - This category covers the
estimated logistical support needed to operate and
maintain the force in Somalia.
3
.
Engineering/Contract support - This category covers
engineering requirements and the costs for contracted
engineer services from Brown and Root.
4. Medical - This category covers the costs estimated for
providing medical support to the forces in Somalia.
5. Reconstitution - This category covers the estimated
costs to reconstitute supplies and equipment back to a
deployment status. The MPS ships would fall under this
category.
6. In Land Transportation - This category covers the
estimated costs for movement of the force and equipment
to and from home bases and points of embarkation and
debarkation.
7 OPTEMPO - This category covered the estimated incremen-
tal costs to support additional Air Force KC-10 and KC-
13 5 flying hours in support of the operation. The
estimate for this support was $110.3 million.
8 Transportation - This category covers the estimated
costs for airlift, sealift, and port handling in support
of the operation. This would be the largest cost area
with an estimate of $182 million.
The estimated airlift costs for deploying, redeploying, and
sustaining the force was $132 million. Sealift cost estimates
were $42 million and port handling costs were $8 million. The
rates used for airlift costs for both inter and intratheater
lifts were as follows: C-130 $2,090/Hr, C-141 $3,255/Hr, C-5
$8,780/Hr, and KC-10 $2,457/Hr. Commercial flight rates will
vary among the various carriers. Estimated intertheater
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airlifts for the operation were approximately 810 C-141, 450
C-5, and 90 commercial flights.
The supplemental offered several offsetting decreases to
fund the estimated $583.2 million. Some of these decreases
included funds that were determined to be excess in each
Service's Personnel Appropriation. Excess funds in the
Personnel Appropriations included the savings attributed to
the volunteer reservists forgoing annual training. Other than
the Air Force, the Services were able to fund the incremental
personnel costs for the operation from funds offered in the
supplemental. The primary decreases to fund the remaining
incremental Operation & Maintenance costs came from National
Guard and Reserve appropriations and Defense-Wide Research
Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Appropriations. The
following quotation best describes the process of developing
the military's portion of a supplemental appropriation.
In what has become an annual ritual after Congress
approves the military budget, the Pentagon submits a list
of pet programs it wishes to rescind. Lawmakers howl with
outrage and offer more modest recommendations. (Schmitt,
January 17, 1993, p. 1:7)
As the events unfolded in Somalia, this initiative would be
delayed and require revisions based on a deployment greater
than ninety days.
To appreciate the development of these estimates, you have
to understand the prevailing situation in Somalia. The
operating conditions for Somalia were austere. There were
severe infrastructure limitations and virtually no Host Nation
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Support (HNS) . This environment would require the military to
operate in an expeditionary manner in Somalia. The role for
transportation in supporting and sustaining the force would be
critical. During the first 30 days, 90% of the force closure
would arrive by air and 10% by sea. After day 30 and for the
life of the logistic plan, sea lift would provide 90% of the
transportation. It was planned that by day 25 (January 3,
1993) the sea lines of communication would be open. However,
sealift would prove to be critical during the early stage of
Operation Restore Hope. Early common services and support to
all members of the Joint Task Force (JTF) would be completely
dependent on the supplies and equipment from MPS (1st FSSG,
August 12, 1993, p. 1).
The Marine Corps would assume overall JTF responsibility
for logistic support during the first 50 days of the
operation. As the theater matured, the Army would assume JTF
responsibility for common item support. This would occur on
January 28, 1993. Since the planning assumed a 90-day opera-
tion, the Army commenced planning on February 17, 1993 to
transition logistic responsibility to UNISOM II. The decision
was made to contract commercially for engineering logistic
support that was hampered by the lack of existing infrastruc-
ture and HNS. This civilian logistic support for a military
operation was deemed appropriate for a humanitarian mission.
By using contractors to augment the lack of HNS, the
military's engineers could be more effectively employed in
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support of the main mission of providing relief supplies to
the country. This contract was negotiated by the Army Corps
of Engineers with the Brown and Root Company. The contract
for logistical services would begin on December 11, 1992 and
be extended under UNISOM II. The estimated costs for these
engineer related tasks would be $50 million for Operation
Restore Hope.
It was determined that contracted logistical support
should be consolidated for all members of the task force.
Consolidation of requirements would save time and money for
everyone. However, Congressional restrictions preclude the
use of DOD funds to pay for coalition support. The Army,
Marine Corps, and Coalition Forces agreed to breakout the
funding requirements needed to reimburse the Brown and Root
company for support provided under the contract. This
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on taskings and the required
reimbursement procedures for contractor support was signed on
March 20, 1993. The reimbursement funding procedure for
coalition logistical support was completed well after the
start of the contract in December 1992. This situation
typifies the processes that DOD would encounter in wrestling
with Somalia funding issues not covered under current policies
or procedures. In a contingency mission, which would charac-
terize DOD involvement in humanitarian missions, the policies
and procedures on funding matters must be in place before the
operation begins.
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The comptroller for the JTF generated the JTF cost
estimates for the operation in January 1993. His cost
estimate totals are approximately the same as those derived by
the Services working with OSD on the zero-based supplemental.
The main cost drivers identified by the JTF in their estimates
were for transportation and contractor support. The airlift
cost estimate for the operation was $269 million, and the
sealift estimate was $124 million. Coalition support cost
estimates were included in the JTF estimates. They were
estimated to be $5.29 million, of which $4 million was for
contractor support from Brown and Root, as of January 29,
1993. Out of this total, $1.3 million would be reimbursable
under the U.N. Trust Fund for approved countries (Interview I
MEF, July 7, 1993) . This fund was established for ten under-
developed nations that were participating in the multi-
national operation. The remainder of the costs was to be
reimbursed under existing or developing support agreements.
As Somalia demonstrated, existing support agreements with
coalition members created varying fiscal rates for services
provided. The need to revise existing agreements to
accommodate standardization in a large coalition is warranted.
C. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE ACTUAL COSTS
On 4 May 1993, the U.S. turned over responsibility for the
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operation in Somalia to the United
Nations. This was two months later then the planned ninety-
day operation outlined in the zero-sum appropriation request
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in January 1993. During the five-month operation, all
Services provided monthly cost reports to the OSD Comptroller.
The final DOD reported total costs for Operation Restore Hope
was $766.1 million. Figure 4-1 provides a breakdown of this
total by component. Appendix E contains the reported costs
for Operation Restore Hope.
The total incremental costs reported by DOD for the
operation was $692.2 million. As defined earlier, incremental
costs are those costs that can be attributed solely to the
operation. Table 4-3 provides a comparison of the total and
SOMAL I A COST BREAKDOW
TOTAL COST 766.1 Ml LL I
MAR INE CORPS 110.7
11*










OPERATION RESTORE HOPE TOTAL AND INCREMENTAL
COSTS (MILLIONS)
SERVICE TOTAL COSTS INCREMENTAL COSTS
ARMY 160.3 160.3
NAVY 36.4 24.7
MARINE CORPS 110.7 110.7
AIR FORCE 69.9 69.9
TRANSCOM 383.3 322.6
DEFENSE AGENCIES 5.5 4.0
TOTALS 766.10 692.20
Source: DOD Comptroller
incremental costs reported by each component. In two cases,
there were significant differences between incremental and
total costs. This occurred with Navy and TRANSCOM reported
costs. In the case involving TRANSCOM, the variance was due
to sealift. Specifically, the costs for MPS and the Afloat
Prepositioning Force (APF) reported only $480 thousand in
incremental costs. Their total actual costs were approxi-
mately $53 million. As indicated earlier, equipment and
supplies from the prepositioning ships provided the critical
early support to UNITAF. Many of the actual costs needed to
reconstitute the prepositioning ships back to a deployment
ready status were already funded under programmed Operation
Desert Shield funds. The Navy cost variance was attributed
to programmed costs for operating its ships in the area.
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To evaluate the costs for Operation Restore Hope, the
actual costs for transportation must be considered. The fact
that incremental costs were reduced by Operation Desert Storm
funding masked the true incremental costs of the operation.
This situation is only applicable to Somalia and cannot be
projected to offset future costs. The largest cost driver for
the humanitarian operation was transportation. This was the
support provided by TRANSCOM to transport and sustain the
military force in Somalia. As was noted in Chapter II,
transportation is the largest cost driver for other DOD
humanitarian programs. The reported total transportation
costs were $383.3 million which represented 50 percent of the
total costs incurred for the operation. This amount also
included $16.3 million in coalition lift support. Figure 4-2
provides a breakdown of the transportation costs by month.
During the first 60 days of the operation, the cost of
transportation provided would be $240.1 million. This amount
is 62 percent of the total transportation cost for the
operation.
The large airlift cost during the first two months coin-
cides with the rapid deployment of the 28,600 person force and
the closure of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) on
January 28, 1993. Once the SLOC was opened, sealift would
play a more significant role in supporting the operation. As
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SOMALIA MONTHLY TRANSPORTATION COSTS
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Note: Seolift includes Port J. Handling costs
Source: DOO Comp t r o I I e r
Figure 4-2
the deployment of the force would come to a conclusion in
January 1993, the retrograde of 850 Marines would also begin
in the middle of January 1993 as a symbolic indicator of our
long-term intentions. This retrograde of the force would
continue in anticipation of the transition of responsibility
to U.N. operation. This transition would not occur in March
as planned, but the force would be retrograded down to 8,000
in phases by the end of April.
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The monthly costs for all Services would also be the
largest during the early phase of the operation. Figure 4-3
provides the breakdown of costs by month for each Service.
The deployment of the 28,600 force in December 1992 would
require 36.4 percent of the total cost of the operation. In
fact, by January 1993, the cost of the operation would be 61
percent of the total. Figure 4-4 provides the cumulative
costs for Operation Restore Hope.














































Source: DOD Comp t r o I I e r
Figure 4-3
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This large initial funding requirement would have to be borne













reprogramming process of the Operation Restore Hope supple-
mental would cause significant readiness problems for the
Services. The Marine Corps would experience a large funding
shortfall. Not only would they absorb the costs of deploying
their own force, but they had to budget for 50-days of
logistic support for the entire JTF. To appreciate the
demands of the operating environment on the JTF, the cost
category of in country sustainment was the largest cost area
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for the Services. Out of the total cost of $382.8 million for
the operation, in country sustainment costs were $278.1
million (72.6 percent of the total costs).
The First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was the command
that provided the Marine Component for the JTF. The MEF would
have to request realignment of second, third, and fourth
quarter O&M funds into the first quarter. This was needed to
budget for its estimated costs of $114 million on December 7,
1992. Within two weeks in country, the Marines realized the
scope of this expeditionary operation and began to revise
their funding estimates. The Marine Corps would incur 70.7
percent of their total costs for the entire operation in the
first month. This new cost estimate of $152 million would
reflect a worst case scenario. This action would reduce Camp
Pendleton's Base Operation funds by 80 percent for the third
quarter and 100% for the fourth quarter. The MEF's rear
operational forces O&M funds would also be reduced by 100% for
both the third and fourth quarters (Interview I MEF Comp-
troller, July 7, 1993). The funding relief in the form of
supplemental reprogramming of funds would not occur until the
summer of 1993. Throughout the operation the MEF was faced
with continual hardships in trying to balance its operational
budget and still maintain its total readiness.
As mentioned in Chapter II, DOD's involvement in Somalia
began in August of 1992. This operation known as Operation
Provide Relief was a JTF and involved mainly the airlifting of
96
humanitarian supplies. The total costs for this operation
were $21 million. TRANSCOM' s DBOF provided the bulk of the
financing for this operation. Partial reimbursements to the
DBOF for this phase of the operation would come over time from
existing DOD disaster assistance accounts. During Operation
Restore Hope, the DBOF would again finance the transportation
costs for the operation. As with the Marine Corps, TRANSCOM
would also experience a tremendous drain on its funding
sources to fund the costs for Somalia. This use of the DBOF
to fund the incremental transportation costs would indirectly
affect everyone that uses the DBOF. The cost charged by
TRANSCOM for its services to DOD depends on its costs to
provide the transportation service.
The Army experience with funding its involvement in
Somalia operations would also create chaos. The disruption
caused by diverting readiness O&M funds to fund Operation
Restore Hope would be large. The Army's most recent total
cost estimate for Operation Restore Hope was $164.8 million
(Freitag, 1993, p. 1). This amount does not include the costs
associated with support provided to other coalition and U.N.
forces for $63.2 million. The reimbursements of these bills
would occur over time. Only $3 million of this amount is
still awaiting reimbursement at this time. These costs are
associated with U.N. Letters of Assist (LOA) such as the
transfer of $27 million worth of trucks to Pakistan. The
Army's involvement in Somalia would continue over into UNISOM
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II under both a U.N. and U.S. command. This topic of DOD
involvement in UNISOM II will be discussed in a later section
of the chapter.
DOD requested $750 million for Congressional Reprogramming
Action for the Somalia Operation Restore Hope in April 1993.
The differences between this figure and the $692.2 million
reported are the ongoing adjustments in completing the billing
rates for all costs. This second supplemental initiative
revises the original zero sum proposal submitted in January
1993. The costs requested in the supplemental were based on
a 150-day operation in support of approximately 24,000 troops.
The plan envisioned having 8,000 troops left by the end of
April 1993. This estimated figure appears to be an extrapola-
tion of the earlier estimate. A model for estimating
incremental costs of non-traditional operations has been
developed by the DOD Comptroller. These estimates developed
by DOD for the costs of the operation in Somalia were reli-
able. Revisions to the funding estimates were required to
account for the large in country support needed early and the
operations extension to five-months. The supplemental was
approved by Congress in June 1993. As with the original
proposal, the supplemental contained no new additional funding
to finance the operation. All funding for the operation would
come from internal DOD reprogramming. However, this time the
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proposed offset for decreases would not come from Congres-
sional pet projects. Appendix F contains a listing of the DOD
appropriations subject to reprogramming.
D. UNISOM II
As outline in Chapter II, UNISOM II would involve DOD in
a U.N. peacekeeping operation. This transition of responsi-
bility over to the U.N. would occur on May 4, 199 3. The
U.N.'s role in Somalia would now change to take on the mission
of nation building. The original mission of Operation Restore
Hope to provide a secure environment to conduct humanitarian
relief operations was successful. The mission of DOD forces
under UNISOM II was to augment the U.N. with both a Quick
Reaction Force (QRF) and a responsive logistical capability.
These two areas of augmentation emphasize the present limita-
tions of the U.N. to conduct large scale humanitarian
operations.
The estimated costs for the U.N. operation over the next
six-month period are $556 million (Interview with Bourseth,
October 7, 1993) . Considering only the U.S. assessment for
U.N. peacekeeping operations, the U.S. share of these costs
for UNISOM II would be approximately $169 million. The
estimated DOD military cost for this six-month period is $56.7
million. The source of funding for this phase of the Somalia
operation would again come from the Service's O&M budget.
However, UNISOM II is occurring near the end of the fiscal
year and the availability of funds are limited due to the
Service's existing obligations. The feasibility of requesting
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another supplemental in FY 93 to fund DOD involvement in
UNISOM II was remote. This was due to the timing of the
operation and the growing Congressional concern over the U.S.
involvement in Somalia.
Congressional involvement in the commitment of DOD
participation in hostile operations are defined in the 1973
War Powers Act which is contained in Public Law 93-148. Under
this legislation the President must report to Congress any
deployment of DOD forces into an area where hostilities are
imminent. Within 60 days of this report, the President must
end the operation unless Congress has enacted specific
authorization for the use of DOD forces (Doherty, February 13,
1993, p. 323). This implies that if Congress does not
authorize the operation the funds needed to finance that
operation are also not authorized. Congress has not
vigorously exercised this authority in the past. When
Operation Restore Hope began, the President told Congress that
DOD forces would not be placed in danger operating in Somalia
(Doherty, February 13, 1993, p. 323). The War Powers Act was
not invoked for Somalia. However, recent events in Somalia,
have provided the impetus to consider debating this require-
ment for Somalia and any future non traditional mission for
DOD forces.
E. FUTURE FUNDING ISSUES FOR SOMALIA
As was addressed earlier, the future funding of DOD
involvement in UNISOM II has taken on a new dimension.
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Attempts to request any FY 1994 funds to support DOD
involvement in Somalia may find Congress not as agreeable as
in the past. Considering our budget deficit environment, the
pressure to reduce rather than increase DOD's budget is a
reality for many. The fact that the budget walls of the BEA
are down in FY 1994, the DOD budget is now more susceptible to
reductions than reprogramming
.
The historical review of DOD humanitarian operations
presented in Chapter II showed that in all cases the missions
were of a contingency nature. Therefore, the costs for these
operations could not be programmed in advance. As such, the
Services are required to fund these operations out of their
own O&M budget and await reimbursement. Reprogramming of DOD
funds through the supplemental process is the current way to
budget for these types of humanitarian operations. This
process may cause two potential problems for DOD. One problem
deals with the availability of funds to pay for these opera-
tions out of the Services O&M accounts. The part of the
fiscal year plays an important role in determining the impact
on the Services. The other problem deals with the time it
takes to process a supplemental appropriation. As with
Operation Restore Hope it took over six months to process the
supplemental. These conditions may cause unnecessary restric-
tions for the commander conducting the operation and the
supporting Service's readiness.
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During Operation Restore Hope, the largest requirement for
funding occurred during the first 30-days of the operation.
This period is the most crucial for a military operation. As
presented earlier, the Services funded this phase of the
operation at the expense of their remaining fiscal year
readiness requirements. If Operation Restore Hope occurred in
the fourth quarter of that fiscal year, the Services O&M funds
would not have been sufficient to cover the costs of the
operation. Emergency measures to fund this operation would
have had to been considered by Congress in this situation.
F. REIMBURSEMENTS
As our government learns to budget in a period of
austerity, the proper use of scarce resources remains
important. In terms of budgeting, the functions of proper
accounting and reporting of costs is essential to the use of
resources. Each military Service employs standardized
accounting procedures to account for the resources entrusted
to them. Due to the limited involvement in non traditional
operations, DOD had never fully exercised the existing
procedures to account for the costs of these missions. The
tracking of costs during Operation Restore Hope was stressed
at all levels. As more attention was placed on proper
accounting procedures, many cost issues were identified in the
Somalia operation.
One issue dealt with the variety or lack of established
support agreements among the forces in Somalia for reimburs-
able support. Existing support agreements vary in terms of
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the required reimbursement. These support agreements were
developed when the external support requirements were small.
Current reimbursement procedures for external support can take
the form of either cash payments or exchange transactions
(bartering) (Schutzenhofer, April 1, 1993, p. 2). This is a
problem that will emerge in any large-scale humanitarian
assistance scenario involving multi-national or U.N. forces.
As we witness the evolution of the U.N. as a viable instrument
for world peace, the future employment of military forces may
involve more operations like Somalia. The development of
standardized support agreements and accounting procedures for
contingency operations is needed. This initiative should
reduce the complexity and time required to implement
reimbursement procedures. During an operation is not the time
to determine that either procedures or policies are not
applicable or adequate to the situation at hand.
As outlined in Chapter III, the U.N. has specific
procedures for authorizing and requesting reimbursements for
support provided. One of the primary U.N. forms used to
request and authorize support is the Letter of Assist (LOA)
.
Support may also be authorized as prescribed by formal support
agreements that cover a specific operation. This general
agreement is the basis for the U.S. support to UNISOM II. The
LOA is still used as the contractual document to request
support and serve as the basis for reimbursement by the United
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Nations. The LOA will contain the type of support required
and the funding limit authorized for the request. Operation
Restore Hope showed that the time between the date support is
provided and reimbursement is received from U.N. may be
considerable. In all external U.N. support requirements, an
LOA is required to establish the baseline for reimbursement.
The U.S. is also entitled to reimbursements for the force it
employs as part of a U.N. Peacekeeping Force (UNPF) . The U.N.
authorizes payment of a monthly rate of approximately $1,000
per man and a percentage reimbursement for depreciation on
authorized equipment to UNPF participants.
Reimbursements from the U.N. for support of peacekeeping
operations has not kept up with demands. Many countries have
not paid their assessments for UNPF operations causing the
funding base of the U.N. to be under funded. The U.N.
peacekeeping budget for 1993 was $2.4 billion. Of this
amount, $1.1 billion represents unpaid contributions from
member states. The U.S. owes $268 million for assessed
peacekeeping operations in addition to the $518 million for
regular U.N. dues (Preston, August 26, 1993, p. A23) . This
lack of U.N. funds has not prevented the U.N. from continuing
to contract for support. The U.N. obligation for this
reimbursement is still valid, but there are no binding
restrictions on the time when the payment is to made. DOD
support under these conditions requires that the Services
continue to fund these support costs out of their O&M budgets.
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This situation presently describes the actions taken by DOD
units supporting UNISOM II. If the U.N. does not have the
funds to reimburse DOD for support provided, the Services will
have to handle these bills internally.
A related issue for DOD is the category of non-
reimbursable U.N. costs. An example would be the U.N.
authorization for payment of UNPF troop rotation every six
months. In Somalia, the Army policy for troop rotation was
every four months. The difference in cost for this two month
period would be an unreimbursable cost to DOD. Another non-
reimbursable cost would be the deployment of equipment not
authorized by the United Nations. The U.N. realizes it does
not have the assets to support a large UNPF force. In large
UNPF operations it will authorize countries to bring specific
equipment along for support. This authorized equipment is
called Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) . COE equipment is
eligible for depreciation reimbursement based on the U.N.
scale. Any equipment that DOD brings in excess to what the
U.N. approves would be considered as a non-reimbursable
expense.
G. CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
During Operation Restore Hope, DOD contracted with a
civilian company, Brown and Root, for in-country logistical
support. The lack of any real infrastructure or HNS necessi-
tated this civilian augmentation. As mentioned earlier, this
contract was negotiated by the Army Corps of Engineers. The
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cost of this contract was approximately $50 million. The
contractor provided most of the efforts in upgrading the
various degraded buildings and facilities used by the JTF.
They also conducted water well drilling, field laundry
service, and operated trash disposal areas (I MEF Comptroller
interview, 1993) . In all, the contract contained about eighty
logistical taskings.
The use of Brown and Root for specific logistical tasks,
provided DOD with two general engineering benefits. It saved
DOD the time and money in acquiring commercial engineering
equipment and supplies needed to upgrade the in country
infrastructure needed to support the JTF. The second
advantage was that it allowed the military's engineer
personnel to devote their maximum efforts to supporting the
humanitarian mission. In order to distribute the relief
supplies, it was required to transport the supplies inland
over the existing road network. The distances between the
inland feeding centers and the main supply points located by
the ports extended as far as 3 05 km to Belet Uem, 23 km to
Baidoa, and 3 00 km to Bardera. This road network required
extensive improvement to support the distribution of supplies.
During the period of December 23, 1992 through March 1, 1993,
the engineers would construct and repair 2,500 km of roads for
this purpose (CJTF J-4 brief August 1993)
.
This contract for engineer support would be continued
under UNISOM II. The contract for Brown and Root would remain
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under U.S. administration during UNISOM II. The U.N. would
reimbursed the U.S. by means of a LOA for requested contracted
services (Sjogren, April 21, 1993) . The issue of non-
reimbursement for incremental expenses related to Operation
Restore Hope would arise under this new contract. DOD
acquired, as a result of the contract with Brown and Root,
some expensive engineer plant equipment. This COE equipment
would be made available for contractor support to the United
Nations. This situation raises the issue of not accounting
for the allocation of overhead costs to the user.
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter we have presented the costs involve with
Operation Restore Hope. This operation is now the United
States' most expensive humanitarian relief effort undertaken
to date. The data on the Somalia operation can be used to
plan for future humanitarian operations. Operation Restore
Hope was a contingency operation for DOD. Contingency
missions by their nature cannot be predicted as to when they
will occur. However, the information available on the funding
requirements of the operation can be used as a guide for
planning future contingencies such as Somalia. Key points
identified in this chapter are:
1. The need to have special provisions to permit DOD to
conduct large scale humanitarian operations without
impairing the readiness of the Services was illustrated
in Somalia.
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2. The first 30-days of the operation required the greatest
amount of funds. The impact on the Services O&M budgets
would be great.
3. This diversion of Services' readiness funds to finance
the contingency operation would cause major disruptions
for all the Services.
4
.
The requirement to have adaptable procedures and
policies for contingency funding matters in advance of
an operation is critical.
5. Reimbursement procedures during the operation required
additional time and negotiation to resolve situations
that had no clear policies established.
6. The Services need a long-term mechanism to solve these
contingency funding problems.
As we have learned over the past year, the call for DOD to
perform humanitarian assistance is growing. The ability of
the Services to balance budgetary requirements for their
primary mission of readiness and pay for contingency missions
is being severely strained. In relative terms, both the
Marine Corps and TRANSCOM budgets receive the biggest impact
in Somalia. The Marine Corps funded 7.3 percent of its
appropriated O&M budget while TRANSCOM funded 34 percent of
its total appropriations for Operation Restore Hope. This
early funding requirement would impact all operations for the
Marine Corps and TRANSCOM. As the budget for DOD continues to
decline, the ability of the Services to absorb these contin-




Where will the next disaster relief, humanitarian assis-
tance or peacekeeping mission take place? What types of DOD
resources will it involve? Who will pay for it? The answer
to the last question is simple. Inevitably the U.S. taxpayer
pays the final bill and therefore public opinion will guide
the government's decision process. The U.S. cannot afford to
be involved in every nation's misfortune around the world. To
respond repeatedly to international crisis while domestic
issues occupy the daily activities of most Americans would
seem to be unrealistic. So what does the future look like?
For continued DOD involvement, it is likely that the U.N. will
have to assume a predominant role in peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance related operations. Although the
United States already contributes a significant amount to U.N.
peacekeeping missions, the participation of others in sharing
the financial burden is often more acceptable to the American
public.
Operations carried out in coordination with the United
Nations, regional organizations and multinational coalition
forces, outline future U.S. military humanitarian assistance
efforts. In the context of United Nation's involvement,
humanitarian assistance is frequently associated with
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peacekeeping operations. In fact, the two terms have become
almost synonymous. It is important to keep this in mind
because much of the research provided in this chapter
addresses the U.N. role in "peacekeeping," however, humani-
tarian assistance is a major component of the operations.
Forces that are "tailor made" to operate in an area
requiring peacekeeping or related humanitarian assistance will
be needed to bolster governments and gain popular support. In
many cases, operations that have a limited member involvement
ensure a better chance of success because of less limiting
factors and a more popular mandate. Humanitarian assistance
operations do not have to be carried out under a U.N. charter.
Whatever the component structure, financing the operation will
still be a determining factor that impacts any operation
undertaken.
The U.N. is still developing the reimbursement procedures
for its peacekeeping operations. Recent funding policies have
been unclear and seem to be administered in an ad hoc manner.
For U.S. military involvement in international peacekeeping
and humanitarian organizations, DOD officials will need the
assurance that their operations and maintenance funds are left
intact. It is one thing to draw upon these funds for domestic
disaster relief and quite another to use it for U.N. opera-
tions. Department of Defense funds exist to provide for the
vital national security interests of the United States. Few
Americans would approve of the transfer of funds appropriated
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for U.S. armed forces to United Nations or coalition peace-
keeping and related humanitarian operations.
This chapter will focus briefly on future disaster relief
and the guidelines that need to be followed before committing
the U.S. military to such operations. The remainder of the
chapter will address the future role of DOD in United Nations,
regional organization and multinational peacekeeping opera-
tions. It is important to understand the current perspective
of those organizations involved in peacekeeping and related
humanitarian operations to assess the future profile of such
operations. Many organizations, such as the State Department
and Department of Defense, realize they must change the way in
which they operate in order to facilitate efficient operations
and funding procedures. This chapter will identify the
changes projected by these agencies. Finally an analysis on
the future of overall funding for peacekeeping and humani-
tarian related operations will be presented.
B. DISASTER RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Disaster relief and the humanitarian assistance operations
that evolve from disaster relief arise out of necessity and
moral precepts. The decision to involve large numbers of U.S.
military forces in such operations came about as the global
environment shifted away from a Cold War ideology. The
movement of troops into these non-traditional roles will
continue there is no longer a need for a show of force against
a Soviet aggressor. Determining where and when disaster
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relief and humanitarian related operations (not in conjunction
with the U.N.) will take place is often difficult because of
their unpredictable nature. Readiness comes from planning,
training, and clarifying funding procedures that can
effectively adapt to varying situations.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs
expects DOD's role in humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief to increase significantly.
Many factors indicate that DOD's role in providing
humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, and its
attendant costs will continue to increase through 1999.
Transportation and other costs are expected to rise
further as the trend continues for greater numbers of
international and nongovernmental organizations to seek
DOD support for their various humanitarian assistance
programs. DOD humanitarian activities in Northern Iraq,
Ethiopia, Somalia and Bosnia foreshadow not only a likely
increase in the number of manmade disasters in the 1990s
as internal and regional instabilities are aggravated in
the post-Cold War era, but also the likelihood that DOD
will be called upon to play a significant role in
subsequent relief efforts. Activities that alleviate
suffering and meet the basic needs of victims of social
dislocation, economic strife, political conflict or
natural disasters can be a helpful foreign policy
instrument. Such efforts can also prove an effective
means of addressing potential sources of regional
instability before they can erupt into conflict and of
promoting recovery and nation building after a crisis has
occurred. (OASD, July 1993, pp. 4-5)
The decision to commit military forces to foreign disaster
relief is sometimes a difficult one to make because of
political implications. Therefore, it is likely that the
magnitude of the disaster will have to be significant to
justify involvement of the military outside its traditional
role. Although disasters are almost impossible to predict,
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there are some likely ground rules that will be followed in
the process of committing military assets and personnel.
1. Local authority must be powerless to cope with the
situation.
2. Civilian authority must be willing to accept the
majority of responsibility and military forces should be
kept at a minimum.
3. Adequate security is made available.
4. Adequate funding exists.
5. The U.S. military's role will end as soon as the
operation can be turned over to a responsible
international body.
These are reasonable constraints that should be considered
before committing DOD resources. It can be expected that U.S.
military involvement will most often occur when the military
would be the decisive element in deterring a "secondary
disaster" of human suffering. (Stackpole, February 1993, p.
18)
C. PEACEKEEPING
We are not the World's policeman, but guess where the
people look when they need a cop.
General Colin Powell
It is important for the United States to remain an active
participant in world affairs, acting closely with allies to
guide the evolution of democracy in a favorable direction and
seek to prevent the emergence of deterrent states. Although
costs in the future will increase, U.N. peacekeeping activ-
ities represent a bargain to the United States with respect to
the maintenance of world peace. The future of U.S. military
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involvement in U.N. operations will expand because they serve
national security interests. Peacekeeping helps prevent
regional conflicts from expanding and directly threatening
U.S. interests. For example, the continuation of the war in
Yugoslavia would have a direct effect on important U.S.
interests in the area. The large flow of refugees could
undermine the efforts to support democracies in neighboring
countries.
Just because peacekeeping represents a fraction of the
cost of a major regional conflict, it is unrealistic to assume
that the funding and cost of such operations is irrelevant.
This is especially true within the political context that
determines U.S. policy. Future peacekeeping and related
humanitarian assistance operations will require a more clearly
defined mandate if they are to be supported by the American
public. Peacekeeping operations are not the guarantor of an
armed truce or economic stability. The United States is
beginning to realize this fact, and therefore will require
more demands on the return of its contributed resources and
military involvement. (Bolton, 1992, pp. 23-27)
Costs to the U.S. will depend on the size and makeup of
U.S. forces that may be deployed to support peacekeeping or
humanitarian operations. To the extent that they proceed
under the U.N. flag, the only DOD incremental costs will be
entitlements for military personnel assigned to the
operations. (OASD, June 1993, p. 13) U.N. Secretary Boutros
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Ghali has described the future role of peacekeeping operations
as efforts to rebuild the institutions and infrastructures of
nations torn by civil war and strife; and in a larger sense to
address the deepest cause of conflict: economic despair,
social injustice and political oppression. (Loomis, 1993, pp.
126-127)
D. COUNTRY PROFILES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS
We have the opportunity to do great things: help stabi-
lize fledgling democracies in countries that have known
only tyranny for decades; promote human rights on a global
scale; use U.N. and relevant organizations to help create
greater international peace. John Bolton, Asst. Secretary
of State (ISA) , 1992.
The degree to which U.N. operations support American
interests will have to be considered in response to the costs
of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Whatever will
make it a reasonable investment for the U.S. taxpayer is
usually the determining factor. Future U.N. operations that
involve the U.S. military will be built around this premise.
According to the Department of Defense the new peace-
keeping policy initiative is projected to require $300 million
in each fiscal year from FY 1995-FY 1999. The budget
estimates are based on peacekeeping operations that have taken
place over the past two years. Approximately $50 million of
the budget is projected to support continuing U.N. operations







- U.N. Iraq/Kuwait observer mission
- Mozambique
- Somalia
The remaining $250 million is expected to be used for new
peacekeeping operations. The Department of Defense has deter-
mined that new peacekeeping (to include concurrent humani-
tarian assistance) operations are likely in the following
countries: Haiti; Liberia; Mozambique; Rwanda; Zaire; Sudan;
and the former Soviet Union. (OASD, June 1993, p. 14) Below
is a brief synopsis of the impending situation in each of the
countries designated for a possible commitment of military
forces.
1. Haiti
There is already a precedent for humanitarian opera-
tions in Haiti. As described in Chapter II, the 1991
Operation GTMO involved U.S. Naval forces, Coast Guard and
Marines in an operation to provide emergency humanitarian
assistance to boat people fleeing political and economic
repression. The continued persistence of refugees could be a
catalyst for any future operations.
The majority of the population in Haiti lives in
abject poverty and does not have access to safe drinking
water, adequate medical supplies or sufficient food. Trade
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sanctions applied by the Organization of American States since
the 1991 coup of President Aristide have further damaged the
economy. The country has little infrastructure and as an
island nation would require naval support in any humanitarian
operation undertaken. With only three permanent-surface
runways, a large logistical support structure would be
required in any military operation. (CIA, 1992, p. 143)
2. Liberia
According to Abass Bundu, executive secretary of the
Economic Community of West African States, "throughout the
whole of Africa, people are looking to the United States to
bring about peace in Liberia" (Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) , June 11, 1993, p. 24). Civil war during 1990
destroyed Liberia's economy and much of the infrastructure in
and around the capital of Monrovia. Political instability in
the country has threatened any prospect for economic recovery
of some of the 750,000 people who have fled to neighboring
countries.
A mostly peacekeeping operation in Liberia would be
similar to the operation in Somalia. There is almost no
infrastructure left and the political situation is severely
fractured. Any operation would probably involve Naval forces
operating from the North Atlantic as well as ground troops
backed by an extensive logistical force. The need for direct
humanitarian assistance in Liberia seems to be less of a
concern then the need for political and economic stability.
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Warring factions have split the country to the point where
only by a third-party intervention can a collective action be
taken to bring Liberia back into the international fold.
(CIA, 1992, p. 198)
3. Mozambique
Per capita income in this country is the world's
lowest at $80 a year (FBIS, June 23, p. 25). Although an
economic reform policy has resulted in successive years of
economic growth, Mozambique continues to be involved in civil
strife. The infrastructure is very limited, as more than half
the country's schools have been destroyed along with many
roads, bridges and commercial facilities. Already Mozambique
receives more than $5 billion in annual economic aid. There
is sufficient infrastructure left, particularly runways and
rail, to support a humanitarian assistance operation. Signi-
ficant logistical support would be required, however, it would
not be as extensive as the operation in Somalia. (CIA, 1992,
p. 237)
4 . Rwanda
Rwanda is a country that already relies heavily on
foreign aid for its economic survival. It is a small country
(about the size of the state of Maryland) and infrastructure
is limited in this landlocked country. Only three permanent-
surface runways exist and the majority of the highways are
gravel or improved earth. The United Nations is already in
Rwanda supervising a truce agreement between rival factions of
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the Kigali government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
Military forces, if called upon would likely take the role of
peacekeepers in an attempt to stabilize the rival factions and




Sudan has been plagued by chronic political instabil-
ity. Sudan has experienced weak economic performances over
the past decade, attributable mostly to reduced rainfall. A
peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance operation here would be
similar to the operation in Somalia. The infrastructure is
limited, however, the level of food shortages is steadily
increasing. Most of the telecommunications in Sudan are well-
equipped by African standards but barely adequate by modern
standards. A significant logistical capability would be
required by any military force assuming a peacekeeping or
humanitarian assistance role in Sudan. (CIA, 1992, p. 322)
6. Zaire
Factions within Zaire have already requested a United
Nation's presence to assess and evaluate the critical human
rights situation that has been going on in that country.
Requests by the Tshisekedi government have called for a U.N.
intervention force to restore the security threatened by the
violence perpetrated by the supporters of President Mobutu.
(FBIS, June 11, p. 1) Zaire is among the poorest nations in
the world. It is almost completely landlocked and any
military operation would require a major logistical
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undertaking. Zaire has twenty-four permanent-surface runways
and a telecommunications system that consists of an unreliable
wire service. (CIA, 1992, p. 379)
7. Former Soviet States
Humanitarian assistance to the former Soviet Union is
already underway in the form of Operation Provide Hope. The
use of extensive military forces in any operation seems
unlikely, however, DOD programs such as the Excess Property
Program are likely sources of humanitarian aid. The political
implications makes the appearance of U.S. military ground
forces unlikely, except if they are under the control of the
United Nations. The continued low-key involvement of U.S.
military personnel in humanitarian airlifts, previews any
future course of action in the newly formed democracies.
E. THE NEW DIRECTION FOR U.N. INVOLVEMENT
These profiles directly reflect the new mission profile of
the United Nations as described in Chapter I. Outlined is a
mission that falls somewhere between traditional peacekeeping
and large-scale collective action. Certain combat risks would
be necessary to bring violence and human rights issues under
control. However, in most cases the military objectives would
be relatively limited. The focus of military efforts will be
to bring about a reasonable level of peace and order so that
humanitarian work can go forward, elections held, and
democratic institutions established. Humanitarian assistance
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efforts in the future will need to be dominated by nongovern-
mental organizations if they are to be effective.
Military intervention only sets the stage for organiza-
tions to move forward, unimpeded by corruption and civil
strife. In each of the countries targeted by the Department
of Defense for peacekeeping operations, mandates will have to
be clearly defined or risk losing the support of American
lawmakers and citizens. It is easy to forecast that humani-
tarian assistance will be required in poor third-world
nations. However, balancing the tasks between military forces
and nongovernmental agencies will be necessary to ensure an
efficient allocation of resources. This is an important
responsibility that the U.S. must assume in its effort to
maintain the new world order.
F. REGIONAL AND COALITION FORCES
Are there other possibilities that have a role to play in
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations besides United
Nations 's involvement? Instability in drawing a consensus for
U.N. missions and difficulties in locating funding sources may
necessitate the future involvement of regional and multi-
national coalition forces.
There are alternatives to U.N. peacekeeping operations.
One of the most predominant is that of shifting the responsi-
bility to regional organizations. Organizations such as the
Organization of American States (OAS) have already been
successful in controlling threats to peace. Regional
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operations have the advantage in obtaining popular support,
because of this, organizations that can directly relate to and
meet the needs of people in the area have a good chance of
success. Another advantage is that regional organizations may
be able to secure the authorization of participating members
easier than a larger organization such as the United Nations.
One drawback to their involvement is the lack of impartiality
that could prevail as compared to a larger, more disinterested
U.N. comprised force.
A second alternative to U.S. involvement in U.N. peace-
keeping and humanitarian operations is the substitution of
multinational coalition forces. Multinational forces are
typically deployed with authority from negotiated agreements
with the disputants. A primary advantage of a multinational
force is the financial stability of the operations. Expenses
are paid for by the participants and not subject to U.N.
limitations. The participating states usually have a direct
interest in resolving the conflict and therefore should incur
the financial burden. Multinational forces also are not
restricted to U.N. limitations on the use of military force in
resolving disputes. Although multinational forces often risk
some impartiality issues they are going to be a likely
alternative in the future, particularly when supported by both
of the disputants. (Diehl, 1993, pp. 210-216)
Regional organizations and multinational forces can help
to reduce the costs to the U.S. by letting those with a direct
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interest shoulder the financial burden. With this in mind
these options outline a legitimate profile for United States
policy on peacekeeping operations around the world.
6. THE FUNDING OUTLOOK
The establishment of the Global Cooperatives Initiative as
a mechanism for funding is unlikely because of weak support
from Congress. On September 30, 1993, the House of Represen-
tatives voted to deny the DOD budget request for this special
global account. Many Congressmen were reluctant to support
any program that would reduce their control over the "purse
strings" for the military and give more power to the executive
branch. (Rogers, 1993, p. 4) Despite the demise of the
Global Cooperatives Initiative, the environment under which it
was developed still exists. The purpose of this appropriation
was to reduce the DOD budget in the future. It was designed
to allow DOD the flexibility to complete its projected short-
term missions, unimpeded by financial limitations. The result
was to be a reduced need for larger forces in the long-term.
In this prevailing political environment, the supplemental
appropriation process and transfers from DOD accounts will
continue as ad hoc funding procedures. In the long-term,
however, some type of program similar to the Global
Cooperatives Initiative will need to be enacted in order to
maintain a desired level of operational readiness.
To the extent that the Department of Defense increases its
involvement in U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,
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it is likely that Congress will attempt to pressure the U.N.
to revise its funding procedures. This will provide some
financial relief to DOD resources as Congress begins to
realize the true cost to U.S. taxpayers of U.N. involvement.
They have taken notice of the disparity in the United States
assessment of 25 percent for the general U.N. budget and 30.4
percent for peacekeeping costs. This is in addition to
providing U.S. logistical support and personnel to many
missions.
For now the Clinton administration has endorsed the idea
of the United Nations shouldering more of the responsibility
in resolving global crisis. Congress, however, has begun to
challenge that position. Already both chambers have reduced
the $64 2 million that the administration requested for U.N.
peacekeeping. As a member of the Security Council, the U.S.
and the four other members must pay 22 percent more than their
regular budget assessment. As the result of a General
Accounting Office study on this issue, it has been recommended
that the Secretary of State instruct the U.S. Representative
in the U.N. to seek support for (1) examining the process used
by the General Assembly committees in reviewing peacekeeping
budgets, (2) requiring that periodic reports be made on audit
findings to member countries for peacekeeping, (3) a re-
examination of the U.N. special assessment scale for peace-
keeping operations. The State Department also added to the
recommendations, viewing it to be even more important that the
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U.N. develop a more accurate budget formulation process.
(GAO, 1992, pp. 4-5)
Currently, the Department of Defense lacks any requirement
to monitor and account for its participation in U.N. peace-
keeping and humanitarian assistance operations. As a result,
DOD has not always tracked the value of its U.N. contribu-
tions. The reimbursement system in place is further
complicated because funding flows from the U.N., through the
State Department, to DOD for reimbursement. This has created
another roadblock to DOD receiving reimbursement, because the
State Department has been reluctant to release funds for
operations which lack accountability. Instead, the State
Department has credited the value of DOD's contributions
against U.S. assessments, dissolving any possibility of
reimbursement to the Defense Department. The General
Accounting Office has sought to remedy this situation by
recommending that in the future the Secretary of Defense:
1. Account for and report DOD peacekeeping assistance to
ensure that the U.S. receives recognition for its
peacekeeping contributions, including personnel costs,
per diem, transportation and other related costs.
2. Update policies and procedures for providing DOD
logistic support to U.N. peacekeeping forces and ensure
that (a) reimbursable costs are properly billed and
controlled and (b) required financial activity reports
are prepared and distributed.
Inevitably, it is Congress that holds the funds for any
U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations. The recommendation made by the GAO is just the
first step in clarifying the total costs within DOD to U.S.
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taxpayers and gaining Congressional support. Another step in
obtaining support for U.N. mandated operations could be
requiring the State Department to notify Congress once
informal discussions of a peacekeeping effort begins at the
United nations. The resulting negotiations can encourage
fiscal responsibility and ensure Congressional support. In
the future, Congressional authorizing committees may be forced
to work more closely with the Administration in planning and
funding the International Affairs account (this account
supports U.S. contributions to the U.N.) to ensure fiscal
reason. (GAO, 1992, p. 4)
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has focused on the likely scenarios for
future humanitarian operations. The profile for U.S.
involvement in peacekeeping and related humanitarian
assistance:
1. Forecasts operations in areas of limited infrastructure
and economic instability;
2. Suggests the environment will dictate a mission some-
where between traditional peacekeeping and large-scale
collective action;
3. Focuses military efforts on bringing about a level of
peace and order so that relief efforts by non-
governmental and international organizations can be
conducted.
United States involvement in U.N. operations, that require
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, will increase in the
future. In addition, regional and multinational coalition
participation should expand, as they provide alternatives to
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the standard U.N. operations and have the potential to provide
more flexibility and better funding to participating members.
The current funding procedures for peacekeeping and human-
itarian operations, for the short-term, will likely continue
as supplemental appropriations and budget transfers from DOD
accounts remain the normal courses of action. In the case of
U.N. mandated operations, Congressional pressure to reform the
funding assessment of 30.4 percent on peacekeeping missions
will most likely continue. Short-term relief from U.N.
reimbursement policies will come in the form of (1) a more
detailed accounting system by DOD and (2) updated policies and





Only recently has the Clinton Administration provided an
outline of their vision for the future of foreign policy.
This vision provides a glimpse of the direction that the U.S.
would follow in the post cold-war era. The strategy would be
based on enlargement rather than containment. Four principles
for this new strategy were presented by Anthony Lake, national
security advisor to President Clinton. These principles are:
1. Strengthen the core of major market economies while
developing bonds of common interest among them. This




Help democracy and markets expand in those new areas
where we have a national security interest. This would
be the CIS, and would also include existing nations
experiencing reversals to democracy.
3. Minimize the external threats by nations outside this
family of democracy and economic markets. This would be
the isolation of nations such as Iraq and North Korea.
4. Establish priorities on when to intervene in the growing
number of unstable situations developing today.
The end of the cold war has eliminated many of the constraints
on intervention. This means setting limits on the number of
future military interventions. (Friedman, 1993, p. A18)
This policy vision indicates two roles for DOD. One is the
traditional role of protecting our country from external
threats. The second role implies DOD involvement in humani-
tarian intervention.
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DOD involvement in humanitarian intervention is the
subject for this thesis. This humanitarian intervention can
take the form of airlifting emergency supplies to Moscow,
conducting Title 10 HA/CA training abroad, or deploying forces
to Somalia. In all these cases, DOD involvement in humani-
tarian activities requires integration with the State
Department. Somalia demonstrates that peacekeeping operation
alone can not solve a nation's problems. The need for nation
building is required for a long term solution. Somalia also
revealed the weaknesses of the U.N. in conducting humanitarian
peacekeeping operations. Recent events suggest that U.S. led
coalitions may be a more effective military force in dealing
with humanitarian assistance. As our new foreign policy
addresses these issues, the biggest challenge to implementing
this vision will be our political will, ability to afford, and
capability to make it happen. This thesis has looked at DOD's
ability to fund its role in this new strategy as we all manage
with limited resources. The ability of the military services
to balance its resources to fund these contingency humani-
tarian operations and still maintain its readiness is the
problem that needs a long term solution.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As a result of our research we were able to answer the
questions presented at the beginning of this thesis. Below is
summary answer to each question based on the research
presented in the previous four chapters.
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1. How are humanitarian assistance operations being
coordinated between DOD and the State Department?
The State Department is responsible for overseeing
humanitarian assistance operations that involve the Department
of Defense. Proposals for planned humanitarian assistance
operations under Title 10 are submitted by the CINCs through
the State Department for approval. In the process of deciding
where to commit Title 10 resources, coordination is carried
out at the CINC level with in-country State Department teams.
These teams, working with U.S. ambassadors, designate viable
military projects that have host nation support.
The State Department also receives all requests from
the U.N. for humanitarian assistance. The State Department
will then coordinate with DOD to provide the support
requested. Reimbursement for DOD contributions to United
Nations humanitarian assistance operations comes in the form
of U.N. credits to the State Department. The State Department
is then responsible for the actual reimbursement of funds to
DOD. The State Department has often foregone this reimburse-
ment policy, and instead applied the credits against the U.S.
general assessment to the United Nations. This places an
increased funding burden on the Department of Defense which
may impact on operational readiness. Current policies and
procedures are under review by the General Accounting Office
to rectify the situation. The Department of Defense, in the
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meantime, is tightening its accounting and reporting proce-
dures to ensure that it receives recognition for its
contributions
.
2. What is the flow of funding within DOD for
humanitarian assistance operations?
Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Affairs are a variety of programs that
support humanitarian assistance operations. These programs
consist of appropriated funds set aside for specific types of
missions and services. Included is the Humanitarian
Assistance Program, Title 10, CINC Initiative Fund and the
Foreign Disaster Relief Assistance Program. These appropri-
ated funds are limited and only available in amounts that can
support operations that are relatively small in scope and
size.
Funding large humanitarian assistance operations comes
from Operations and Maintenance appropriations, supplemental
appropriations, and transfers from other DOD accounts. To
begin an operation, O&M funds will be required before more
direct funding becomes available. Additional funding will
have to engage the supplemental appropriation process which
will involve congressional approval. An alternative to this
approach is to transfer funds from other DOD accounts. This
option also requires congressional approval.
Transportation costs are unique in the funding
process. The U.S. Transportation Command is typically
responsible for providing this support element to any
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humanitarian assistance operation. They have the authority to
borrow funds from the DBOF to finance transportation costs.
Since transportation can easily reach more than 50 percent of
the total costs this amount is significant. TRANSCOM is
required to reimburse the DBOF once supplemental appropriation
is approved.
3. What are the costs involved in humanitarian assistance
operations?
Operation Restore Hope (ORH) provides a good example
of the costs involved in a large scale contingency humani-
tarian assistance (HA) operation. The costs that were
incurred can be used as a model for estimating and planning
the costs for future HA operations. This operation required
the military to operate as part of both a multinational and
U.N. peacekeeping force. The operation illustrated the
differences between reimbursable and non-reimbursable costs
under various types of military organizations. Since ORH had
to be conducted from the bottom up, as the country possessed
an austere infrastructure and Host Nation Support was non
existent, it can be used as a model for a worst case HA
scenario. Transportation costs proved to be the largest cost
driver for ORH. In all other DOD HA programs, transportation
has also been the largest cost element. In ORH transportation
costs covered the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of
the force. The initial deployment for ORH required the
largest commitment of funding resources. This large require-
ment for early funding would have a significant impact on the
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military services, who are required to initially fund these
unprogrammed contingencies.
4. What are likely scenarios for future humanitarian
assistance operations?
Humanitarian assistance operations involving DOD will
occur all around the globe. Each year the Department of
Defense projects likely operational possibilities in
designated countries. The countries currently profiled have
very limited infrastructures and each suffers from severe
economic instability. This will dictate that any operation
involve the large logistical support elements that are
necessary to support military forces from ground zero. As a
result, increased funds need to be available early in an
operation to support the deployment phase. Without a funding
mechanism, such as the Global Cooperatives Initiative, future
operational readiness will be impacted by humanitarian
assistance operations, as Operations and Maintenance funds are
used to finance the startup costs. To relieve some of the
burden from DOD, an expected increase in United Nations,
Regional Organization, and Multinational Coalition Forces is
likely by the United States. In the case of U.N. involvement
in humanitarian assistance operations, the mission for U.S.
forces will fall somewhere between traditional peacekeeping
and large scale collective action. Military efforts will be
focused on bringing about stability to an area so that
nongovernmental agencies can provide unimpeded humanitarian
assistance. Military involvement is likely to be limited in
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duration following the stabilization of an area, lasting just
long enough to transfer responsibility to international relief
agencies.
Likely scenarios for future humanitarian assistance
operations include Regional Organization and Multinational
Force involvement. Both provide alternatives to the more
restrictive U.N. operations and alleviate some of the funding
issues. Each country is responsible for the costs that they
incur in providing support. The countries involved typically
have a security interest in the area that makes it in their
best interest to contribute resources. The U.S. will be
involved in these types of operations when:
1. An international consensus is difficult to obtain under
U.N. provisions;
2. Military forces require more flexibility then allowed
under a U.N. charter;
3. Vital U.S. security interests are at stake;
4. Host nation support exists for such an operation;
5. Public opinion dissuades U.N. involvement.
The United States will continue to look for oppor-
tunities to share the burden of humanitarian assistance
operations. Department of Defense funds exist to support the
vital security interests of the United States. Any humani-
tarian mission that diverts funds from this purpose can expect
only limited support. It is important to remember that
humanitarian assistance is not the primary mission of the
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military. Demand for this type of operation will continue
only as long as a spirit of global cooperation exists.
5. At what levels can humanitarian assistance operations
be planned for in advance?
They can be planned from a small scale disaster relief
operation of transporting only emergency supplies to a large
scale multinational humanitarian operation involving the
employment of a large military force as in Somalia. Contin-
gency operations involving multinational forces can be planned
based on existing plans and procedures. This is true for
operations involving regional countries such as those
belonging to NATO. Provide Comfort was an example of a HA
operation involving NATO forces. Throughout Provide Comfort,
existing NATO procedures were applicable to the conduct of the
operations. During Sea Angel, we witnessed the prior planning
by CINCPAC for disaster relief operations in its area of
responsibility. These contingency plans provided guidance for
the commander in planning for Sea Angel. As Somalia demon-
strated, the planning for U.N. humanitarian intervention
requires revised policies and procedures.
6. Primary research question: How can DOD effectively
plan budgeting requirements for future humanitarian
assistance operations?
Since humanitarian assistance operations can not
always be predicted, borrowing authority for DOD is the
critical problem for budgeting future HA operations. As a
general rule, funding responsibility for any costs incurred in
a HA operation rests with the Service tasked to perform the
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mission. Additional legislative funding options are pursued
to reimburse the Services for these costs. However, pending
the time it takes to approve legislative action, current
Service resources (O&M accounts) must be used to finance these
costs. Operation Restore Hope placed a severe demand on all
the Services to "borrow" funds to pay for this contingency
operation. TRANSCOM borrowed from the DBOF to finance the
transportation costs of the operation. The Services had to
realign their budgets for the remaining fiscal year to borrow
funds to pay for the large costs incurred early in the
operation. Legislative funding options took six months and
provided only for the reprogramming of existing DOD funds to
pay for the operation. The outlook for acquiring additional
legislative funds through supplementals to support these
contingencies does not look promising. The realities of a
large federal deficit and a requirement to increase spending
on domestic economic needs constrains the future DOD budget
environment. Operation Restore Hope also illustrated that
procedure and policy problems involved with reimbursements
could also delay or deny funds to the Services. If Somalia is
the example for the future employment of DOD, the Services
need a long term mechanism to solve these contingency funding
problems. The Services can no longer afford to suffer current
funding measures for meeting today's humanitarian demands.
What is required today is a sound fiscal policy that insulates
the Services from the disruption, on the ability to prepare
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for their primary role as a force in readiness, that is caused
by these contingencies.
Non-traditional operations such as humanitarian
assistance could become one of DOD's primary roles in the
future or DOD could develop specialized units for this mission
as part of an international force. Today DOD is meeting this
challenge by integrating all its resources in a joint manner.
As DOD adapts internally to these roles, the external
structure that governs the funding for DOD must also evolve as
the environment changes. If our nation is to be successful in
meeting its emerging national security goals, the political,




This research produced five recommendations to improve the
funding process supporting humanitarian assistance operations.
1. The Global Cooperative Initiative Fund should be
introduced again in the FY 1995 DOD budget submission.
This fund should be structured as a revolving fund to
both disburse funds and receive reimbursements involved
with the support of contingency operations. The demise
of the initiative in 1993 was due to two factors: the
late submission of the initiative in the budget process,
and the growing concern by Congress over the commitment
of DOD forces in dangerous humanitarian intervention
without Congressional involvement. The initiative
proposal should be drafted with language that ensures
Congressional involvement in the deployment of DOD
forces for such humanitarian intervention. Without
considering the role of Congress in this matter, any
funding initiative introduced that does not ensure their
involvement will be challenged. The impact of not
incorporating Congressional concerns will be that we
will continue to apply short term measures to a problem
that needs a long term solution.
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2. A review of existing fiscal policies and procedures
governing participation in humanitarian intervention
involving both coalition and U.N. organization is
required. The goal of this effort should be the
definition of those costs that are both reimbursable and
non-reimbursable. This effort should also review all
existing agreements that cover DOD logistics support
provided to foreign countries. Revision to these
documents should be made to ensure standardized rates
and procedures are incorporated. This action supports
our main recommendation in two ways: it should
facilitate the identification of proper costs to be
reimbursed to the revolving fund, and it will ensure
that DOD has standardized fiscal procedures to support
future humanitarian operations.
3. Inclusion of subjects on humanitarian intervention
operations and the organizations involved should be
incorporated into our military education curriculum. If
the goal of a new U.N. is the vision of the future, all
military students should understand its organization,
procedures, and capabilities. Key military personnel
involved with fiscal matters need to be trained and
educated in the fiscal policies, procedures, and forms
used in humanitarian intervention. This recommendation
could be accomplished by conducting joint training
exercises both with and without troops that characterize
U.N. operations. This type of training would benefit




A memorandum of understanding between the DOS and DOD
needs to be developed for reimbursement to DOD for
support provided to the United Nations. As the role of
DOD increases in humanitarian intervention, the
authority of DOS to waive DOD reimbursement becomes a
net transfer of funds from DOD to DOS concerns. This
situation requires modification to account for the
increased participation and costs of DOD in humani-
tarian intervention. These reimbursements should flow
back to the revolving fund to offset disbursements made
from the fund.
5. The need to expand DOD's role in humanitarian assistance
is prudent. Humanitarian assistance can be defined as
preventive medicine. As we illustrated in Chapter II,
when a nation's internal problems are caused by either
natural or man-made disasters and are not remedied, they
can lead to violence and instability. DOD humanitarian
assistance, in the form of Title 10 programs, should be
an integral part of a long term strategy based on the
well being and development of a recipient nation.
138
Expanding the funding for Title 10 programs would
provide valuable training for DOD and be part of the
initial efforts to implement a coordinated long term
strategy for our new vision. By integrating long term
development projects with Title 10 programs we will
realize a better use of limited resources to achieve a
common goal. To this end, authority to call up selected
reservists for humanitarian assistance operation,
without a declared mobilization should be considered for
legislation.
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APPENDIX A: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
EXCESS PROPERTY DONATIONS FOR FY 1991
DATE COUNTRY DESCRIPTION OF CARGO
MODE OF
TRANSPORT
10/90 Cambodia Medical Supplies Sea
10/12/90 Philippines Heavy Equipment Sea
10/16/90 Trinidad and Medical Supplies Air (C-130)
10/17/90 Poland General/Medical Supplies Land
10/25/90 Philippines Medical Supplies Sea
10/25/90 Philippines Medical Supplies Sea
10/25/90 Czechoslavkia Medical Supplies Air (C-5)
10/30/90 Philippines Medical Supplies Sea
11/05/90 Cambodia Medical suppl ies Sea
11/05/90 Cambodia Rations Sea
11/09/90 Mexico Medical Supplies Air (C-5)
11/21/90 Philippines Medical Supplies Sea
11/30/90 Antiqua General/Medical Supplies Air (Log air)
12/04/90 Hungary Ambulances Air (C-5)
12/05/90 Philippines Food/ Medical Supplies Sea
12/06/90 Nicaragua Medical/Baseball Supplies Air (C-5)
12/07/90 Argentina General/Medical Supplies Air (C-5)
12/12/90 Philippines Facilit ies Supplies Sea
12/16/90 Afganistan Clothin<^/Equipment Cold Air (C-5)
12/27/90 Cambodia Medical Supplies Sea
12/27/90 Cambodia Truck/Water Trls Sea
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01/07/9 L Philippines Jeep Sea
01/07/9: [ Philippines Trucks Sea
01/91 Panama Heavy Equipment Sea
01/24/9: [ Vietnam Medical Supplies NGO
01/31/9:I Philippines Office Furniture/Tools Sea
02/07/9:I Philippines Medical Supplies Sea
02/15/9]I Brazil Steel Pipe And Fittings Sea
02/15/91 . Nicaragua Medical Supplies Private Air (C-5)
02/25/9] Liberia Medical/Food Private Air (C-130)
02/26/9]i Laos Medical Air (C-130)
03/01/9] 1 Laos Medical Air (C-130)
03/05/9] [ Cambodia Vehicle Parts/Tools Sea
03/06/9] i Romania Medical Supplies Private Air (C-5)
03/14/9] 1 Philippines Medical Supplies Sea
03/14/9] I Philippines Heavy Equipment Sea
03/17/9] i Romania Medical/Blood Supplies Air (C-130)
03/18/9] i Philippines Medical Supplies Sea
03/23/9] Kuwait Litter/Cots Private Air (C-5)
03/24/9] I Afghanistan Clothing/Gear Cold Private Air (C-5)
03/27/9] I Bahrain Medical Supplies Land
03/26/9] [ Cambodia Furniture/Medical Supplies Sea
04/01/9] [ Cambodia Medical Supplies Sea
04/01/9]I Cambodia M880 Trucks Sea
04/03/9]I Peru Cots Private Air (C-5)
04/06/9]I Peru Medical Supplies Private Air (C-5)
04/10/9] i Philippines Electrical Equipment Sea
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04/22/91 Sri Lanka Medical Supplies Sea
05/01/91 Grace-Air 3 Aircraft Engines N/A
05/06/91 Sri Lanka Trucks/Engineer Equipment Sea
05/09/91 Bangladesh Medical/General Supplies Air (C-141)
05/10/91 Bangladesh Food/Medical Supplies Air (C-5)
05/16/91 Madagascar M880 Trucks Sea
05/16/91 Romania Medical Private Air (C-5)
05/28/91 Tonga Trucks and Trls Sea
05/31/91 Cambodia Engineer Equipment Sea
06/04/91 Kuwait Food/Medical Private Air (C-5)
06/04/91 Egypt Medical Supplies Air (C-5)
06/07/91 Turkey Medical Supplies Air (C-5)
06/12/91 Laos Medical supplies Air (C-141)
06/15/91 Ecuador Cots/Food Private Air (C-5)
06/15/91 Peru Cots/Medical Private Air (C-5)
06/08/91 Ethiopia 1 MREs Air (C-5)
06/08/91 Ethiopia 2 MREs Air (C-5)
06/08/91 Ethiopia 3 MREs Air (C-5)
06/08/91 Ethiopia 4 MREs/B Rations Air (C-5)
06/08/91 Ethiopia 5 MREs/B Rations Air (C-5)
06/08/91 Ethiopia 6 MREs Air (C-5)
06/19/91 Ethiopia Sea MREs Sea
06/25/91 Philippines MREs(2 Flights) Air (C-130)
06/26/91 Philippines MREs(2 Flights) Air (C-130)
06/27/91 Philippines MREs(2 Flights) Air (C-130)
06/29/91 Philippines MREs Air (C-130)
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07/01/91 Philippines Disaster Relief Stocks
07/01/91 Ethiopia 7 MREs/B Rations
07/02/91 Ethiopia 8 MREs
07//91 Ethiopia Sea 2 MREs
07/03/91 Ethiopia 9 MREs
07/08/91 Chad Food/Medical Supplies
07/10/91 Romania General/Medical Private
07/16/91 Mongolia 1 General/Medical supplies
07/17/91 Soviet Georgia Cots/supplies Private
07/18/91 Ethiopia 10 Mixed Salmon/MREs
07/21/91 Ethiopia 11 MREs
07/23/91 Ethiopia 12 MREs/B Rations
07/24/91 Albania 1-8 MREs/B Rations
07/25/91 Ethiopia 14 Tents
07/27/91 Ethiopia 15 MREs
07/29/91 Yugoslavia Medical Supplies
07/30/91 Ethiopia 16 MREs/Tents
07/91 Guinea-Bissau Medical Supplies
07/91 Kenya MREs
07/91 Madagascar Medical Supplies
07/91 Western Samao Medical Supplies
07/30/91 Peru Medical supplies
07/31/91 Ethiopia 13 Litters/Cots
08/02/91 Djibouti MREs
08/06/91 Jamaica B Rations




























08/91 Ethiopia 18 MREs/Tents Air (C-5)
08/08/91 Ethiopia 19 MREs Air (C-5)
08/09/91 China 1 Cots/Blankets Air (C-5)
08/10/91 Ethiopia 20 Blankets/Cots Air (C-5)
08/17/91 Ethiopia 21 MREs Air (C-5)
08/20/91 Ethiopia 22 MREs Air (C-5)
08/20/91 Cambodia General Supplies Sea
08/22/91 Ethiopia 23 MREs Air (C-5)
08/23/91 Philippines Furniture Sea
08/23/91 Philippines Trucks/Medical Supplies Sea
08/26/91 Romania MREs Air (C-5)
08//91 Albania 9-12 MREs Air (C-141)
08/91 Sierra Leone Trucks Sea
08/91 Sierra Leone B Rations Sea
08/91 Sierra Leone Medical Equipment Sea
08/91 Mexico Medical/Hospital Supplies Surface
08/91 Nicaragua Medical/Hospital Supplies Surface
08/91 Grenada Heavy Equipment Sea
08/91 Guatemala Heavy Equipment Sea
08/91 Rwanda Ambulances Air
08/91 Peru Food/MREs Sea
08/91 Sri Lanka Medical Supplies Sea
08/91 Bangladesh Medical supplies Sea
08/91 Maldives Medical Supplies Sea
08/91 Tonga Medical Supplies Sea
08/91 Ivory Coast B Rations Sea
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08/91 Haiti B Rations Sea
08/91 Guyana B Rations Sea
08/91 Nicaragua B Rations Sea
08/91 Bolivia B Rations Sea
08/91 Djibouti Medical supplies Surface/Air
08/91 Mali B Rations Sea
08/91 Cambodia Medical supplies Sea
09/91 Poland Ambulances/Medical Surface/Air
09/91 Poland Clothing Surface
09/91 Djib./Ethiop. 4 WD trucks Sea
09/91 Poland B Rations Sea
09/91 Romania Private Cargo Air (C-5)
09/91 Laos Medical/Pnvate Cargo Air (C-141)
09/91 Mexico Medical/Hospital Supplies Surface
09/91 Mongolia 2 Medical/Ambulances/Food Air (C-5)
09/91 Bangladesh Trucks Sea
09/91 Philippines Heavy Equipment Sea
09/91 Mali Medical Supplies Sea
09/91 Malawi Medical Supplies Sea
09/91 Cameroon Medical Supplies Sea
09/91 Namibia Medical Supplies Sea
09/91 Rwanda Medical Supplies Sea
09/91 Niger Medical Supplies Sea
09/91 Albania Trucks And Ambulances Sea
09/91 Peru Clothing Sea
09/91 Ecuador Clothing Sea
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09/91 Mali Fire Trucks
09/91 Philippines Hospital Supplies
09/91 St. Lucia Heavy Equipment






APPENDIX B: RECORD OF DOD RESPONSE TO OFDA REQUESTS

































Famine/DOD Survey Team for






















Floods/Airlift Plastic Sheeting $28,488
Cyclone/Airlift Comm. Equip., $240,000
Personnel, Plastic
Flood/Airlift Cots $25,000






























Air Crash/DOD Personnel State
Funded
Typhoon/Airlift Supplies to $50,000
Remote Areas
Civil Strife/DOD Personnel $7,400
Floods/Helicopter SAR Team $105,000
Explosion/DOD Medical Team $25,000
Civil Strife/Airlift Plastic $147,000
Floods/Airlift Personnel & Plastic $30,000
Floods/Airlift Personnel & Plastic $185,000
Locust Plague/Airlift Comm. Equip. $975
Floods/Airlift Personnel Supplies $400,000
Hurricane/Airlift Supplies Equip. $218,000
Hurricane/Airlift Supplies Equip. $233,000
Floods/Helicopter SAR Team $100,000
Locust/Airlift Pesticide $370,000
Equipment And Personnel
Plane Crash/Remains Retrieval $28,000
Famine/Airlift, Air Drops $125,000
Earthquake/Airlift Personnel $590,000
Famine/Airlift Personnel $125,000
Civil Strife/Airlift DOD $5,000
Medical Supplies
Flooding/DOD Engineer Team $60,000
































































DISASTER ASSISTANCE SUPPORT PEAKS - ANDREW, INIKI, OMAR
FLORIDA HAWAII GUAM LOUISIANA
PERSONNEL 23587 3728 798 36
BREAKDOWN
ARMY 17102 2933 41 36
NAVY 4134 924 299 —
AIR FORCE 1393 188 251 —
MARINES 817 475 175 —
CANADIANS 398
NATIONAL GUARD 5991 1798 328 1350
ARMY RESERVES 794
DLA 25 1 1
OTHER DOD
CIVILIAN
919 137 79 208
SUPPORT
MREs 1,003,000 326,000 250,000
MKTs 53 10




PRIME POWER GEN 35 8 9
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DISASTER ASSISTANCE SUPPORT PEAKS • ANDREW, INIKI, OMAR




TENTS 2,879 100 384
COTs 54,884 1,600 2,837
BLANKETS 100,000







537.0 MIL 46.5 MIL
VEHICLES 4,701
SHIPS 6 2 9
HELICOPTERS 157
RADIOS ISSUED 20,500
Source: Dept Of Army, "Hurricane Andrew, Typhoon Omar, Hurricane
Iniki After Action Report," 1993.
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APPENDIX D
NATIONAL COSTS ELIGIBLE FOR REIMBURSEMENT BY THE U.N.
The following list, although not exhaustive, details those
reimbursable costs that a member state may incur when
contributing to a U.N. mission.
1. Mission subsistence allowance;
2
.
Standard troop cost reimbursements including elements
for personal clothing, equipment and ammunition;
3. Welfare costs including an element for recreational
leave;
4. Rations;
5. Daily allowance to troops;
6. Travel to mission area, rotation and repatriation;
7. Death and disability awards;
8. Locally recruited staff salaries;
9. Rental and maintenance of premises;




14. Air operations in theater;
15. Aviation fuel;
16. Air crew subsistence allowance;
17. Air ground handling costs;
18. Renovation of equipment;
19. Acquisition and rental of vehicles;




23. Vehicle workshop equipment;
24. Vehicle insurance;
25. Communications equipment;
26. Freight and cartage;
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